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THROUGH A GLASS, DARKLY:
SYSTEMIC RACISM, AFFIRMATIVE ACTION, AND
DISPROPORTIONATE MINORITY CONTACT †
Robin Walker Sterling*
This Article is the first to describe how systemic racism persists in a society that
openly denounces racism and racist behaviors, using affirmative action and
disproportionate minority contact as contrasting examples. Affirmative action
and disproportionate minority contact are two sides of the same coin. Far from
being distinct, these two social institutions function as two sides of the same
ideology, sharing a common historical nucleus rooted in the mythologies that
sustained chattel slavery in the United States. The effects of these narratives
continue to operate in race-related jurisprudence and in the criminal legal system, sending normative messages about race and potential using the same jurisprudential trick: denial of our country’s race-bound legacy. By juxtaposing
the rhetoric and jurisprudence concerning the underrepresentation of white
people in the criminal legal system with the rhetoric and jurisprudence concerning the underrepresentation of Black people in higher education, this Article illuminates a key feature of how systemic racism persists.
Obscuring the history of how both affirmative action and disproportionate minority contact came to be, the racially contorted narratives that we have
adopted about affirmative action in both guises described here—affirmative
action that benefits people of color by accepting them into institutions of higher
learning and that which benefits white people by diverting them from the criminal legal system—allow systems to thrive under a guise of presumed racial

† “Through a glass, darkly” is taken from Paul’s First Letter to the Corinthians: “For
now we see through a glass, darkly; but then face to face: now I know in part; but then shall I
know even as also I am known.” 1 Corinthians 13:12 (King James). Here, the phrase describes
the mirror-like relationship between affirmative action in higher education and disproportionate minority contact with the criminal legal system.
* Associate Dean for Clinical Education, Bluhm Legal Clinic Director, and Mayer
Brown/Robert A. Helman Professor of Law, Northwestern Pritzker School of Law. I would like to
thank Rebecca Aviel, Patience Crowder, Nancy Ehrenreich, Kate Evans, Barbara Fedders, Andrea Freeman, Kristin Henning, Osamudia James, Nancy Leong, Jyoti Nanda, and Deborah
Weissman for their very insightful comments. I thank Lindsey Webb, Sara Hildebrand, and
Catherine Smith for their support. This paper greatly benefitted from presentation to the faculties
of the Northwestern Pritzker School of Law and the Texas A&M University School of Law. Finally,
I thank Elena Engel, Jenna Bragagnolo, and Chloe Edmonds for truly excellent research assistance.
I dedicate this article to the memory of Professor Christopher N. Lasch. Professor Lasch
was a brilliant scholar and clinician, and one of the best colleagues and friends I have ever been
lucky enough to know. In short, he was my favorite. I miss him terribly. I am an immeasurably
better teacher, lawyer, scholar, and person for having known him.
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innocence. Unmoored from the force of history, we rudderlessly reinforce wellworn social norms, no matter how discriminatory they might be.
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INTRODUCTION
Law enforcement’s underwhelming response to the breach of the United
States Capitol on January 6, 2021, starkly contrasts with the heavy-handed reaction to Black Lives Matter protests in the summer of 2020. 1 January 6
marked the first time the Capitol had been breached since 1814, when British
troops set fire to the building while it was still under construction. 2 Several
hundred Trump supporters scaled the Capitol’s walls, broke windows and
doors, and used battering rams to gain entry to the building while congresspeople were certifying the electoral college results of the November 2020 presidential election. Many protestors wore bullet proof vests, armor, and riot
gear. 3 Protestors were armed with zip ties, flag poles, and bear spray. 4 In addition to the weapons used at the Capitol, pipe bombs were later found at the
headquarters of the Republican and Democratic National Committees just
blocks away. 5 The rioters quickly overwhelmed police officers to gain entry.
Once the building was breached, congresspeople were evacuated or hidden for
their own safety. Staff members blockaded themselves in offices with furniture
and hid under tables. A noose had been erected outside; the rioters chanted
“Hang Mike Pence,” 6 “Fuck the Blue,” 7 and called for House Speaker Nancy

1. Rachel Chason & Samantha Schmidt, The Freedom to Assemble in Two Acts: Lafayette
Square, Capitol Rallies Met Starkly Different Policing Response, WASH. POST (Jan. 14, 2021),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/dc-md-va/interactive/2021/blm-protest-capitol-riot-policecomparison [perma.cc/9ZFF-HT4H].
2. Amanda Holpuch, US Capitol’s Last Breach Was More Than 200 Years Ago,
GUARDIAN (Jan. 6, 2021, 7:59 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2021/jan/06/us-capitol-building-washington-history-breach [perma.cc/3GCM-J5ZL]. Although the Capitol has
been the site of several attacks and bombings, the January 6, 2021, riot marked the first time
since the War of 1812 that the building had been entered and taken by force. Id.
3. Tina Nguyen & Daniel Lippman, How a Sparse Protest Became a Capitol Hill Riot,
POLITICO (Jan. 6, 2021, 7:52 PM), https://www.politico.com/news/2021/01/06/how-capitolhill-riots-started-455654 [perma.cc/LXM9-6DBB].
4. Mitchell Willetts, Blinded, Beaten, Screaming for Mercy: Police Officers Recount Capitol Riot, MIA. HERALD (Jan. 15, 2021, 5:51 PM), https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nationworld/national/article248542835.html [perma.cc/W9W6-9SY8]; Spencer S. Hsu, Tennessee
Man with Zip Ties at Capitol Could Face Charges of Sedition, Other Felonies After Riot, Prosecutors Say, WASH. POST (Jan. 24, 2021, 6:48 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/legalissues/tennessee-man-with-zip-ties-at-capitol-could-face-charges-of-sedition-other-feloniesafter-riot-prosecutors-say/2021/01/24/d9c3cc58-5e83-11eb-9430-e7c77b5b0297_story.html
[perma.cc/4M6H-7NTP].
5. Dalton Bennett et al., Pipe Bombs Found Near Capitol on Jan. 6 Are Believed to Have
Been Placed the Night Before, WASH. POST (Jan. 29, 2021, 1:27 PM), https://www.washingtonpost
.com/investigations/2021/01/29/pipe-bomb-suspect-video [perma.cc/BQD9-U99F].
6. Lisa Mascaro, Eric Tucker, Mary Clare Jalonick & Jill Colvin, Trump Trial Video Shows
Vast Scope, Danger of Capitol Riot, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Feb. 10, 2021), https://apnews.com/article/trump-impeachment-trial-update-2-10-2021-4f49705a5f92bd4129941ec409642ecd.
7. Jon Swaine, Dalton Bennett, Joyce Sohyun Lee & Meg Kelly, Video Shows Fatal Shooting
of Ashli Babbitt in the Capitol, WASH. POST (Jan. 8, 2021, 12:57 PM), https://www.washingtonpost
.com/investigations/2021/01/08/ashli-babbitt-shooting-video-capitol [perma.cc/MV6P-T85S].
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Pelosi 8 as they moved through the building. The police union would later report that 140 officers were injured, many of them seriously. 9 Two responding
Capitol Police officers died by suicide after the attack. 10
This attack was not a surprise. In the days leading up to the insurrection,
Parler and other social media platforms were “seething with references to potential violence,” plainly revealing the rioters’ intent. 11 Pronouncements of violence were so widespread that FBI intelligence privately warned of the
coming insurrection. 12 The first barriers were breached between 12:53 p.m.
and 1:03 p.m. 13 The sergeant-at-arms would not deem the building secured
until after 5:00 p.m., a full four hours later. 14
In stark contrast, the police response to the preceding summer’s overwhelmingly peaceful Black Lives Matters demonstrations 15 was so violent that
police conduct seemed to reaffirm the need for protest. 16 Examples of police
violence abound, many of them recorded. On May 30, an NYPD officer approached an African American protestor who was wearing a mask over his
nose and mouth as a COVID precaution. 17 The civilian had his hands up. The
officer walked up to the man and pulled down his mask to better pepper spray

8. ‘Where Are You Nancy?’: Rioters Search for Pelosi in Footage Shown by Impeachment
Managers, NBC NEWS (Feb. 10, 2021), https://www.nbcnews.com/video/house-impeachment-managers-show-footage-of-capitol-rioters-searching-for-pelosi-100824133975 [perma.cc/JH4Q-U6G6].
9. Tom Jackman, Police Union Says 140 Officers Injured in Capitol Riot, WASH. POST (Jan.
27, 2021, 7:47 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/public-safety/police-union-says-140officers-injured-in-capitol-riot/2021/01/27/60743642-60e2-11eb-9430-e7c77b5b0297_story.html
[perma.cc/QG9Y-2HRN].
10. Id.
11. Craig Timberg & Drew Harwell, Pro-Trump Forums Erupt with Violent Threats
Ahead of Wednesday’s Rally Against the 2020 Election, WASH. POST (Jan. 5, 2021, 12:57 PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2021/01/05/parler-telegram-violence-dc-protests [perma.cc/DUD3-HN7C].
12. Chason & Schmidt, supra note 1.
13. Lauren Leatherby et al., How a Presidential Rally Turned into a Capitol Rampage, N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 12, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2021/01/12/us/capitol-mob-timeline.html [perma.cc/74GG-B27Q].
14. Id.
15. Erica Chenoweth & Jeremy Pressman, This Summer’s Black Lives Matter Protesters
Were Overwhelmingly Peaceful, Our Research Finds, WASH. POST (Oct. 16, 2020, 6:00 AM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2020/10/16/this-summers-black-lives-matter-protesters-were-overwhelming-peaceful-our-research-finds [perma.cc/HA86-RCE3].
16. USA: Law Enforcement Violated Black Lives Matter Protesters’ Human Rights, Documents Acts of Police Violence and Excessive Force, AMNESTY INT’L (Aug. 4, 2020, 6:00 AM),
https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2020/08/usa-law-enforcement-violated-black-livesmatter-protesters-human-rights [perma.cc/N9EK-H82N] (“The unnecessary and sometimes
excessive use of force by police against protestors exhibits the very systemic racism and impunity
they had taken to the streets to protest.”).
17. Erica Byfield, Protester Speaks Out After Mask Ripped off by NYPD and PepperSprayed in Brooklyn, NBC N.Y. (June 5, 2020, 1:26 AM), https://www.nbcnewyork.com/news/local/protester-speaks-out-after-mask-ripped-off-by-nypd-and-pepper-sprayed-in-brooklyn
/2448135 [perma.cc/7ZJ4-F89H].
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him. 18 On that same day, Atlanta police broke the windows of the car of two
college students, tased one of them, then dragged them out of the car through
the broken windows. 19 The students were on their way home from buying
food after the city’s 9 p.m. curfew and got caught in traffic caused by a protest
against police violence. 20 On June 4 in Buffalo, New York, an officer pushed a
seventy-five-year-old man while “another extend[ed] his baton toward him
with both hands.” 21 The elderly protester fell to the ground. As the elderly
protester was lying motionless, blood flowing from his right ear, officers
walked past without rendering aid. 22 Perhaps the most infamous example of
law enforcement’s overreaction to Black Lives Matter protests 23 was the June
1 incident in which a phalanx of law enforcement officers removed a diverse
group of peaceful protesters from Lafayette Square, near the White House,
with chemical agents and rubber bullets. 24
Of all the possible reasons for the difference in law enforcement’s response, the most obvious is also the most popular. The sea of faces the police
would have seen when they looked out into the crowds looked very different
in the two situations. While the pro-Trump protestors were predominantly
white, a more diverse group protested police violence for Black Lives Matter. 25
While the BLM protests were meant to express explicit support for the worth
of Black life, the Capitol insurrection expressed explicit support for a candidate who was endorsed by many far-right, white supremacist groups, 26 who

18. Id.
19. Amir Vera, 2 Atlanta Officers Fired After Video Shows Them Tasing Man and Using
‘Excessive Force’ on Woman, Mayor Says, CNN (June 4, 2020, 8:19 PM), https://www.cnn.com
/2020/06/01/us/atlanta-cops-fired-excessive-force/index.html [perma.cc/NYM2-QSFH].
20. Id.
21. Neil Vigdor, Daniel Victor & Christine Hauser, Buffalo Police Officers Suspended After
Shoving 75-Year-Old Protester, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 23, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2020
/06/05/us/buffalo-police-shove-protester-unrest.html [perma.cc/K27C-HB6J].
22. Id.
23. See, e.g., Katie Way, Police Violence at Protests Is Undeniable. All the Videos Are Right
Here, VICE (June 5, 2020, 5:56 PM), https://www.vice.com/en/article/7kpbmy/police-violenceat-protests-is-undeniable-all-the-videos-are-right-here [perma.cc/956U-DRA5]. The list includes a video of a police officer trampling a BLM protester with his horse. Id.
24. Chason & Schmidt, supra note 1 (“In the early evening, shield-bearing riot officers
and mounted Park Police brutally routed those gathered, apparently without provocation or audible warning as required by law. Shortly after, Trump strode through the cleared park with
military leaders at his side to pose at a church whose leaders didn’t want him there.”).
25. Jon Greenberg & Noah Y. Kim, Black Lives Matter Protests and the Capitol Assault:
Comparing the Police Response, POLITIFACT (Jan. 8, 2021), https://www.politifact.com/article/2021/jan/08/black-lives-matter-protests-and-capitol-assault-co [perma.cc/VS59-9Z3Q].
26. See John Haltiwanger, Trump Has Repeatedly Been Endorsed by White Supremacist
Groups and Other Far-Right Extremists, and They’ve Looked to Him as a Source of Encouragement, INSIDER (Sept. 30, 2020, 3:59 PM), https://www.businessinsider.com/trumps-history-ofsupport-from-white-supremacist-far-right-groups-2020-9 [perma.cc/3ZQD-YUBS].
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won every white demographic, 27 and who lost every demographic of every
other racial or ethnic group decisively. 28 And while the BLM protests were
overwhelmingly peaceful, 29 Trump supporters came to the Capitol armed. 30
But while police officers met the BLM protesters with tear gas and rubber bullets, officers took selfies with the pro-Trump protesters and helped them down
the stairs of the Capitol. 31 The protests share an inverted relationship, as if
reflected in a funhouse mirror. This distorted relationship is also reflected in
the way race and underrepresentation are treated in our societal institutions.
Consider the following example. In March 2018, days after the mass
shooting that killed seventeen people and injured seventeen others at Marjory
Stoneman Douglas High School, 32 high school students across the country
mobilized to participate in a series of nationwide protests urging gun reform. 33
Many principals, spurred in part by the march’s being scheduled for a school
day, reacted by sending out notices threatening students who participated in
the demonstrations with suspensions and other disciplinary action. 34 In response, Yale, MIT, Boston University, the University of Virginia, Dartmouth,
Amherst, Brown, Smith, and dozens of other prominent colleges and universities posted tweets reassuring students that school discipline resulting from
participation in antigun protests would not jeopardize their chances of admission. 35 A sample tweet from Brandeis read, “Brandeis supports students’ right

27. Charles M. Blow, Opinion, Exit Polls Point to the Power of White Patriarchy: Some
People Who Have Historically Been Oppressed Will Stand with Their Oppressors, N.Y. TIMES
(Nov. 4, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/04/opinion/election-2020-exit-polls.html
[perma.cc/D76G-6W8A].
28. See id. I use Black and African American interchangeably throughout this Article, and
I capitalize “Black” because, as Professor Kimberlé Crenshaw explains, “Blacks, like Asians, Latinos, and other ‘minorities,’ constitute a specific cultural group and, as such, require denotation
as a proper noun.” Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331, 1332 n.2 (1988).
By that same logic, I do not capitalize white because “whites do not constitute a specific cultural
group.” Kimberle Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1241, 1244 n.6 (1991).
29. See Chason & Schmidt, supra note 1.
30. See Nguyen & Lippman, supra note 3.
31. See Chason & Schmidt, supra note 1.
32. February 14 2018: Teen Gunman Kills 17, Injures 17 at Parkland, Florida High School,
HISTORY (Feb. 13, 2020), https://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/parkland-marjorystoneman-douglas-school-shooting [perma.cc/66ZT-6BAK].
33. Sarah Gray, Thousands of Students Walked Out of School Today in Nationwide Protests. Here’s Why, TIME (Mar. 14, 2018, 6:14 AM), https://time.com/5195960/national-schoolwalkout-march-14 [perma.cc/R7T9-XEK4].
34. David Williams, Schools Threaten to Punish Students Who Join Walkouts over Gun
Control, CNN (Feb. 21, 2018, 4:10 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2018/02/21/us/student-walkoutpunishment-trnd/index.html [perma.cc/6NKW-JARK].
35. Julia Reinstein, Colleges Are Promising High Schoolers That Getting Suspended for Protesting Guns Won’t Hurt Their Admissions Chances, BUZZFEED NEWS (Feb. 24, 2018, 11:24 AM),
https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/juliareinstein/colleges-are-promising-high-schoolersthat-getting [perma.cc/3UWL-GYRP].
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to stand up for their beliefs. Those who participate in peaceful protests will
not jeopardize their admission to Brandeis. Speak up, speak out.” 36 Attendees
of these protests were predominantly white. 37 No arrests of the thousands of
protesters who gathered were reported. 38 At least one of the organizers, a
white teenager named David Hogg, went on to matriculate at Harvard, 39 one
of the prestigious colleges that had promised amnesty for participants.
In the aftermath of Derek Chauvin’s murder of George Floyd in May
2020, protesters marched in cities all across the United States. 40 Floyd’s killing
sparked peaceful protests, riots, and looting. 41 The country has seen similar
community reactions in the wake of the deaths of Michael Brown, Tamir Rice,
Freddie Gray, Stephon Clark, and other unarmed Black men, women, and
children at the hands of police—a mix of peaceful vigils and protests, sometimes accompanied by scattered destruction of property and looting.
Coming on the heels of the deaths of Ahmaud Arbery and Breonna Taylor, Floyd’s death led to a dramatic increase in white participation in protests
against police brutality. 42 Before George Floyd’s killing, participants in policebrutality protests were predominantly nonwhite. 43 Schools generally did not
issue reassurances to any teenaged protesters who might have participated in
these actions. They did not validate the choice of a student who might have
taken part to “speak up” or “speak out.”
This story, of the predominantly white groups who participated in the
gun-reform protests and the predominantly Black groups who participated in
protests against police brutality before the summer of 2020, is an affirmative

36. Abby Patkin, Univ. Addresses Applicant Fears, JUSTICE (Mar. 6, 2018, 11:00 AM),
https://www.thejustice.org/article/2018/03/tweet-protest-applicant-relief [perma.cc/BJE3-3FPL].
37. German Lopez, Teens Started March for Our Lives, but All Ages Participated, VOX (Mar.
30, 2018, 10:00 AM), https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2018/3/30/17177432/march-forour-lives-gun-control-children-age [perma.cc/8WQB-L2M8].
38. No Arrests as Tens of Thousands Turn Out for Downtown LA Gun Control March,
NBC L.A. (Mar. 24, 2018, 8:21 PM), https://www.nbclosangeles.com/news/los-angeles-to-joinnationwide-march-for-our-lives/36262 [perma.cc/92GA-ERKL].
39. David Hogg Says He’ll Attend Harvard University in the Fall, CBS NEWS (Dec. 22,
2018, 2:23 PM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/david-hogg-parkland-shooting-survivor-sayshell-attend-harvard-university-in-the-fall [perma.cc/AJH2-ZHCM].
40. Evan Hill et al., How George Floyd Was Killed in Police Custody, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 20,
2021), https://www.nytimes.com/202/05/31/us/george-floyd-investigation.html [perma.cc/B4J7566K].
41. See Chason & Schmidt, supra note 1.
42. Jesse Washington, Why Did Black Lives Matter Protests Attract Unprecedented White
Support?, UNDEFEATED (June 18, 2020), https://theundefeated.com/features/why-did-black-livesmatter-protests-attract-unprecedented-white-support [perma.cc/9ATZ-NDSA]. Ahmaud Arbery
was jogging when he was shot and killed by white men who wrongly suspected him of committing burglaries in the neighborhood. Breonna Taylor was shot and killed while she slept in her
bed in a botched execution of a warrant by Louisville police. See Richard Fausset, Before Breonna
Taylor and George Floyd, There Was Ahmaud Arbery, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 13, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/02/28/us/ahmaud-arbery-anniversary.html [perma.cc/2LZT-WB6U].
43. Washington, supra note 42.

458

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 120:451

action story, although not the kind that typically comes to mind when we
think of affirmative action. Normally, we think of affirmative action as a policy
that ensures that qualified members of traditionally underrepresented groups,
like people of color and women, receive fair consideration by institutions such
as corporations and universities. 44 In this atypical affirmative action story, David Hogg and the other mostly white protesters are the affirmative action beneficiaries. Not affirmative action including them in higher education—
affirmative action diverting them from the criminal legal system.
White people are an underrepresented group in the criminal legal system.
The mostly white March for Our Lives protesters were shown special solicitude
that excluded them from the criminal community and from the consequences
that school disciplinary actions and criminal arrests might have had on their
futures. 45 These kinds of facially race neutral but functionally racially disparate actions that usher white people out of the criminal legal system go largely
unnoticed. Hidden in plain sight, they act as a kind of affirmative action for
white people, keeping them underrepresented in the criminal legal system.
In contrast, affirmative action in higher education, which aims to include
people of color in higher education, is routinely disparaged. Although affirmative action policies seek to counteract the effects of past discrimination and
exclusion on the participation of people of color in the academic community,
their perceived effect is to give unqualified members of underrepresented
groups an undeserved advantage in college admissions based solely on their
race, gender, national origin, or ethnicity. 46 In May 2016, a group of organizations filed complaints with the United States Department of Education
against Brown University, Dartmouth College, and Yale University, alleging
race-based discrimination against Asian American applicants. 47 Several states,
including Arizona, California, Florida, Michigan, and Washington, prohibit
44. See, e.g., Precious D. Hall, White Fragility and Affirmative Action, 12 J. RACE & POL’Y
7, 8 (2017). Affirmative action policies also exist in workplaces and other institutions. See
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995) (involving a financial incentive for
awarding government contracts to disadvantaged subcontractors on the basis of race); Wygant
v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986) (involving a school-board policy of using race when
determining who is and is not laid off).
45. Of course, schools did not make their promises to only the white protesters. But since
most of the protesters were white and most of the schools promising amnesty have predominantly
white student bodies, white children were the main beneficiaries of the schools’ promises. See Jeremy Ashkenas, Haeyoun Park & Adam Pearce, Even with Affirmative Action, Blacks and Hispanics
Are More Underrepresented at Top Colleges Than 35 Years Ago, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 24, 2017), https://
www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/08/24/us/affirmative-action.html [perma.cc/PW3G-RVTP].
46. See Hall, supra note 44, at 14.
47. ASIAN AM. COAL. FOR EDUC., COMPLAINT OF THE ASIAN AMERICAN COALITION FOR
EDUCATION V. YALE UNIVERSITY, BROWN UNIVERSITY, AND DARTMOUTH COLLEGE FOR
UNLAWFUL DISCRIMINATION AGAINST ASIAN-AMERICAN APPLICANTS IN THE COLLEGE
ADMISSIONS PROCESS 1 (2016), http://asianamericanforeducation.org/wp-content/uploads/2016
/05/Complaint_Yale_Brown_Dartmouth_Full.pdf [perma.cc/5QH9-EXKG]; AACE Applauds
U.S. Departments of Education and Justice’s Joint Investigation of Yale University and Urges All
Colleges to Treat Asian American Applicants Fairly and Lawfully, ASIAN AM. COAL. FOR EDUC.
(Sept. 26, 2018), http://asianamericanforeducation.org/en/pr_20180926 [perma.cc/3F58-U9LH].
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state universities from considering an applicant’s race as a factor in admissions. 48 And Harvard and the University of North Carolina were recently sued
by plaintiffs who alleged that the schools’ use of race as a factor in admissions
constitutes invidious, race-based discrimination in contravention of Title VI
of the Civil Rights Act. 49
The criminal legal system, however, is one area in which most Americans
seem to view the overrepresentation of people of color and the underrepresentation of white people as largely justified. 50 People of color, and Black and
Latino people in particular, are overrepresented at every discretion point in
the criminal legal system, from arrest and bail determination to plea negotiations and sentencing, Black and Latino suspects fare worse than white counterparts facing similar charges. 51 Since rates of offending do not explain this
discrepancy, 52 this overrepresentation of people of color in the criminal legal
system 53 necessarily means that white people who commit crimes are underrepresented in the criminal legal system. The overrepresentation of people
of color in the criminal legal system is most commonly called disproportionate minority contact. Tellingly, there is no specific term for the underrepresentation of white people in the criminal legal system. But that
underrepresentation could easily be called affirmative action. In the criminal
legal system, instead of making sure that white people are included in numbers that represent their fair share of the population, affirmative action means
that white people are underincluded. In this way, affirmative action in higher
education that benefits the Black community and affirmative action in the
criminal legal system that benefits white people share an inverted relationship.
48. ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 36; CAL. CONST. art. I, § 31; MICH. CONST. art. I, § 26; WASH.
REV. CODE § 49.60.400 (2021); Fla. Exec. Order No. 99-281 (1999) (known as the “One Florida
Initiative”).
49. Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. Univ. of N.C., No. 14-cv-954 (M.D.N.C. Oct. 18,
2021), appeal docketed, No. 21-2263 (4th Cir. Nov. 10, 2021); Students for Fair Admissions, Inc.
v. President & Fellows of Harvard Coll., 980 F.3d 157 (1st Cir. 2020), petition for cert. filed, No.
20-1199 (U.S. Feb. 25, 2021).
50. Other areas in which many Americans seem to accept the overrepresentation of people of color and the underrepresentation of white people include school disciplinary proceedings
and the immigration enforcement system.
51. See Gary Ford, The New Jim Crow: Male and Female, South and North, from Cradle
to Grave, Perception and Reality: Racial Disparity and Bias in America’s Criminal Justice System,
11 RUTGERS RACE & L. REV. 324, 324–26 (2010); see also JAMES AUSTIN ET AL., JFA INST.,
UNLOCKING AMERICA: WHY AND HOW TO REDUCE AMERICA’S PRISON POPULATION 1, 7 (2007).
Although this Article focuses specifically on the narratives undergirding anti-Black racism, Latinos and other racial and ethnic minorities bear similar disparities in both higher education and
in the criminal legal system. AUSTIN ET AL., supra, at 7. The dialogue concerning race relations
in the United States is most often focused on the relationship between Black people and white
people, but it is critical to note that the narratives animating the histories of anti-Latino racism,
anti-Asian racism, and anti–Native American racism are potent as well.
52. See Ford, supra note 51, at 336.
53. See Nordia A. Campbell et al., Disproportionate Minority Contact in the Juvenile Justice System: An Investigation of Ethnic Disparity in Program Referral at Disposition, 16 J.
ETHNICITY CRIM. JUST. 77, 78–79 (2017).
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Juxtaposing the rhetoric and jurisprudence concerning the underrepresentation of white people in the criminal legal system with the rhetoric and
jurisprudence concerning the underrepresentation of Black people in higher
education, this Article illuminates a key feature of systemic racism using the
lens of representation. By obscuring the history of each of these institutions,
the racially contorted narratives that we have adopted about affirmative action
in both guises described here—affirmative action that benefits people of color
by accepting them into institutions of higher learning, and affirmative action
that benefits white people by diverting them from the criminal legal system—
allow systems to thrive under a guise of presumed racial innocence. Unmoored from the force of history, we rudderlessly reinforce well-worn social
norms, no matter how discriminatory they might be.
This Article argues that, despite their ostensibly very different functions
and goals, these two social institutions function as two sides of the same ideology, perpetuating, in concrete ways, long-held stereotypes about Black intellectual inferiority, Black criminality, white intellectual superiority, and white
innocence. This Article further argues that the criminal legal system and higher
education’s common historical nucleus, based in the mythologies that sustained United States chattel slavery and in their parallel histories since the civil
rights movement of the 1960s, reveals the depth of their connection, and that
even though their respective race-related precedents suggest otherwise, each of
these institutions sends the same normative messages about race and potential
using the same jurisprudential trick: denial of our country’s race-bound legacy.
Part I starts with an examination of both institutions’ racialized origins
dating back to American chattel slavery and continues with a discussion of
their analogous evolution in the wake of the civil rights movement. Part II
juxtaposes the race-related case law in the two systems. Part III assesses the
effects of the Court’s struthious disregard of historical context with a case
study that contrasts the presumed innocence of white applicants who cannot
benefit from admissions policies that include race as a factor with the presumed guilt that undergirds discussion of system-involved people of color.
I. THE PARALLEL ORIGINS, HISTORIES, AND CONSEQUENCES OF RACECONSCIOUS ADMISSIONS AND DISPROPORTIONATE MINORITY CONTACT
There are many reasons to juxtapose race-conscious admissions and disproportionate minority contact. As social institutions, higher education and
the criminal legal system carry normative meanings that transcend their obvious functions. “Education,” Glenn Loury argues, “is a special, deeply political, almost sacred, civic activity.” 54 “[P]ublic schools serve as one of few
interfaces with government and operate as a primary site for regular commu-

54. Glenn C. Loury, Foreword to WILLIAM G. BOWEN & DEREK BOK, THE SHAPE OF THE
RIVER: LONG-TERM CONSEQUENCES OF CONSIDERING RACE IN COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY
ADMISSIONS, at xxii (2d. prtg. 2000).
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nity interaction” and “remain the site of intense social, political, and legal conflict.” 55 Because of education’s emphasis on potential, “the selection of young
people to enter prestigious educational institutions amounts to a visible, highstakes exercise in civic pedagogy.” 56 In other words, everyone knows that institutions of higher learning are where “access to influence and power is rationed.” 57 And so it makes perfect sense that choosing those who get to exploit
these opportunities becomes a “political act[] with moral overtones.” 58
Similarly, involvement in the criminal legal system means more than
breaking the law. The reality is that “the public, commonsense understanding
of criminality retains . . . special moral and stigmatic weight.” 59 In other
words, “[c]riminal convictions are not technocratic, bureaucratic incidents:
they morally matter.” 60 The hundreds of successful crime-related television
shows, movies, and podcasts show that “[c]riminal justice, more than almost
any other area of law, is morally freighted in the popular imagination, and its
moral significance is linked closely to its legitimacy.” 61
But race-conscious admissions and disproportionate minority contact
have more in common than their moral weight. Each is also deeply rooted in
the mythology about Black inferiority and criminality that evolved, over decades marked by a constantly expanding and urgent need for labor, to legitimize
United States chattel slavery. Below, I detail their common historical nucleus
and their emergence after the civil rights movement of the 1950s and 1960s.
A. Slave Rebellions, Fear, and the Birth of Stereotypes
If all men were created equal, entitled to life, liberty, and the pursuit of
happiness, then American chattel slavery was a great and inexcusable sin—a
centuries-old sin that would become indispensable to the South’s labor-intensive agrarian economy, but a sin nonetheless. The rub was that the moral
bankruptcy that allowed the South to build its economy on “the peculiar institution” 62 was repaid thousands of times over by the South’s unprecedented
economic success, so vital to the life of the young Union. But that economic
success relied on slaves being denied fair wages, subjected to unsafe working
conditions, subdued with violent punishment, and robbed of their freedom—

55. Osamudia R. James, White Like Me: The Negative Impact of the Diversity Rationale on
White Identity Formation, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 425, 456 (2014).
56. See Loury, supra note 54, at xxii.
57. Id.
58. See id.
59. ALEXANDRA NATAPOFF, PUNISHMENT WITHOUT CRIME 191 (2018).
60. Id.
61. STEPHANOS BIBAS, THE MACHINERY OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, at xxiv (2012).
62. See generally KENNETH M. STAMPP, THE PECULIAR INSTITUTION: SLAVERY IN THE
ANTE-BELLUM SOUTH (Vintage Books 1989) (1956).
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in other words, the southern economy was not forgiving enough to allow enslaved people to be equal. 63 If slaves could not be treated equally, and all men
were created equal, then slaves must not be men. The cells of racialized conceptions of intellectual inferiority and criminality metastasized in tandem
with the southern economy’s desperate need for labor. 64
The first African slaves arrived on the shores of Virginia in 1619. 65 When
they arrived, they were legally categorized as “servants,” much like white servants in the colony. 66 In fact, Black people and non-English servants of European descent were circumscribed by similar legal limitations. 67 This “servant”
designation was not significantly different from similar legal statuses then
practiced in many other countries. 68 And while the early colonists recognized
racial difference as a concept, 69 they were not as strictly segregated in work,
friendships, and social status as they would become under chattel slavery. 70
Between 1641, when Massachusetts became the first colony to legalize
slavery, and 1691, the year South Carolina passed the first comprehensive
slave codes, 71 the colonies slowly eroded the rights of Black people, constructing the caste system that would become American chattel slavery. The loss of
rights and the change in status was gradual, happening over the course of a
generation. In 1643, Massachusetts and Connecticut adopted a fugitive slave

63. See generally EDWARD E. BAPTIST, THE HALF HAS NEVER BEEN TOLD: SLAVERY AND
THE MAKING OF AMERICAN CAPITALISM (2014).
64. See Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1707, 1717 (1993)
(“The construction of white identity and the ideology of racial hierarchy also were intimately
tied to the evolution and expansion of the system of chattel slavery.”).
65. A. LEON HIGGINBOTHAM, JR., IN THE MATTER OF COLOR: RACE AND THE AMERICAN
LEGAL PROCESS; THE COLONIAL PERIOD 20 (1978).
66. Id. at 21; see also Oscar Handlin & Mary F. Handlin, Origins of the Southern Labor
System, 7 WM. & MARY Q. 199, 203 (1950) (“The status of the Negroes was that of servants; and
so they were identified and treated down to the 1660’s.”).
67. Raymond T. Diamond & Robert J. Cottrol, Codifying Caste: Louisiana’s Racial Classification Scheme and the Fourteenth Amendment, 29 LOY. L. REV. 255, 259 n.19 (1983).
68. For example, in the Spanish and Portuguese colonies, slavery was a type of indentured
servitude that could end after a specific term. Influenced by Roman law, countries like Spain and
Portugal considered slavery an accidental status that could ensnare anyone, regardless of race.
In other words, “[Roman] slavery was fundamentally different from [United States chattel] slavery in being an equal opportunity condition—all ethnicities could be slaves—and in seeing slaves
as primarily a social, not an economic, category.” Philip D. Morgan, Origins of American Slavery,
OAH MAG. HIST., July 2005, at 51, 51–52.
69. See WINTHROP D. JORDAN, WHITE OVER BLACK: AMERICAN ATTITUDES TOWARD
THE NEGRO, 1550–1812, at 3–43 (2d ed. 2012) (describing early colonial racism).
70. See DAVID R. ROEDIGER, THE WAGES OF WHITENESS: RACE AND THE MAKING OF THE
AMERICAN WORKING CLASS 24 (rev. ed. 2007) (noting examples of allegiances between Black
and lower-class white colonists, including at integrated social functions and in urban slave revolts between 1607 and 1800). The earliest line of demarcation was religion, not race. See Diamond & Cottrel, supra note 67, at 259 n.19.
71. The Law Steps In, THIRTEEN, https://www.thirteen.org/wnet/slavery/timeline/1641.html
[perma.cc/XN3R-EBP8].
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law. 72 In 1662, Virginia passed a law decreeing that children of Black mothers
“shall be bond or free according to the condition of the mother.” 73 In that same
year, Massachusetts, New York, Connecticut, and New Hampshire passed
laws restricting Black people’s right to bear arms. 74 And in 1664, Maryland
forbade marriage between Black men and white women. 75
In 1680, perhaps in response to Bacon’s Rebellion, Virginia forbade Black
people and slaves from bearing arms, 76 prohibited Black people from assembling in large numbers, 77 and mandated harsh punishment for slaves who assaulted Christians or attempted escape. 78 Two years later, Virginia declared
that all imported Black servants were slaves for life. 79 In 1684, New York made
it illegal for slaves to sell goods. 80 This period, from 1680 to 1684, was a busy
time for passage of the anti-Black provisions and slave codes that would “codify[] the extreme deprivations of liberty already existing in social practice,” 81
including limiting Black people’s rights to travel without a permit, to own
property, to assemble publicly, to be educated, and to own weapons. 82 In 1691
Virginia passed the first antimiscegenation law, forbidding marriages between
white people and Black people or white people and Native Americans; it also
exiled manumitted slaves from the colony. 83 By the end of this period, “[r]acial
identity was further merged with stratified social and legal status: ‘Black’ racial
identity marked who was subject to enslavement; ‘white’ racial identity
marked who was ‘free’ or, at minimum, not a slave.” 84
In the two centuries between the legalization of slavery in 1641 and the
beginning of the Civil War, the South’s agrarian economy became a commercial juggernaut. Cotton, tobacco, and sugar cane were lucrative, labor-intensive crops, requiring hours of arduous, backbreaking work under the hot
southern sun. The South did not just need a labor force. It needed a labor force
it could compel. As the need for cheap, exploitable labor grew, so did false
mythologies about Black people’s being “dumb, lazy, childlike, and in need of

72. Id.
73. A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr., Virginia Led the Way in Legal Oppression, WASH. POST
(May 21, 1978), https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/opinions/1978/05/21/virginia-ledthe-way-in-legal-oppression/664bcdf4-8aaf-475f-8ea7-eb597aee7ecd [perma.cc/2MPE-J5WX].
74. The Law Steps In, supra note 71.
75. Id.
76. Emergent Conflict, THIRTEEN, https://www.thirteen.org/wnet/slavery/timeline/1676
.html [perma.cc/HW7J-4GZ3].
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Harris, supra note 64, at 1718.
82. Id.
83. Emergent Conflict, supra note 76.
84. Harris, supra note 64, at 1718.
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[the] guidance and supervision” of “smart, hardworking, and more intellectually and morally evolved” white people. 85 The landed upper class loosened its
grip on the white labor population, only to tighten its fist around Black labor.
Laws linking rights to national origin sprung up to create a class that necessarily
excluded Black people, and “their racial otherness,” in most instances impossible to hide, came to “justify the[ir] subordinated status.” 86 Of all the factors
that contributed to the stratification of Black and poor white communities, the
most impactful was that “[t]he economic and political interests defending Black
slavery were far more powerful than those defending indentured servitude.” 87
White southerners, looking at the world through race-colored glasses,
adopted beliefs and practices that morphed American chattel slavery from a regressive maw of rank exploitation into a benevolent act of enlightened charity
that white southerners reluctantly, but valiantly, undertook. So certain were
white southerners that “none but the [B]lack race can bear exposure” to the
relentless tropical climate that cotton, tobacco, and sugar cultivation required
that Mississippi included this language in its declaration of secession. 88 White
southerners used dehumanizing language for the enslaved. Advertisements
for slave auctions described Black men as “bucks,” Black women as “wenches,”
and Black children as “pickaninnies.” 89 Many white southerners believed
American chattel slavery was ordained by the parable of Noah’s son Ham in the
Book of Genesis. 90 After Ham had seen Noah naked and drunk, Noah cursed

85. Bryan Stevenson, A Presumption of Guilt: The Legacy of America’s History of Racial
Injustice, in POLICING THE BLACK MAN: ARREST, PROSECUTION, AND IMPRISONMENT 3, 7 (Angela J. Davis ed., 2017). In 1857, addressing the state legislature, Mississippi governor William
McWillie described slavery this way:
[T]he institution of slavery, per se, is as justifiable as the relation of husband and wife,
parent and child, or any other civil institution of the State, and is most necessary to the
well-being of the negro, being the only form of government or pupilage which can raise
him from barbarism, or make him useful to himself or others; and I have no doubt that
the institution, thus far in our country, has resulted in the happiness and elevation of both
races; that is, the negro and the white man.

Id. (quoting Impertinence of the Abolitionists. Slavery Forever!: Extracts from the Inaugural Message
of Gov. McWillie, of Mississippi, to the Legislature of That State, LIBERATOR, Dec. 11, 1857, at 1).
86. Harris, supra note 64, at 1717.
87. ROEDIGER, supra note 70, at 32; see also CHRISTOPHER LASCH, THE WORLD OF
NATIONS: REFLECTIONS ON AMERICAN HISTORY, POLITICS, AND CULTURE 17 (1973) (arguing
that the ideology of the “Negro” and “related . . . concepts of African, heathen and savage” became prominent “at the very point in time when large numbers of men and women were beginning to question the moral legitimacy of slavery” as a way to justify the institution).
88. JOURNAL OF THE STATE CONVENTION, AND ORDINANCES AND RESOLUTIONS ADOPTED IN
JANUARY, 1861, at 86 (Jackson, Miss., E. Barksdale 1861) [hereinafter MISSISSIPPI DECLARATION].
89. See Great Sale of Slaves: January 10, 1855, AMERICA’S BLACK HOLOCAUST MUSEUM,
https://abhmuseum.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/04/Slave-Auction-1855.jpg
[perma.cc/UZ3U-XL7A] (depicting the slave-auction poster).
90. See Genesis 9:18–27 (King James); Felicia R. Lee, From Noah’s Curse to Slavery’s Rationale, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 1, 2003), https://www.nytimes.com/2003/11/01/arts/from-noah-scurse-to-slavery-s-rationale.html [perma.cc/DYM8-U453].
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Ham’s son Canaan to be “a servant of servants”; 91 slaves were the cursed descendants of Ham and Canaan. 92 Conjured from fabricated physical differences, a practice of dehumanization, eugenics, religious interpretation, and
the ever-growing demand for exploitable labor, justifications for American
chattel slavery found tenacious purchase. With these narratives, white southerners made themselves the heroes of their own rapacious story, laundering
the quest for economic exploitation through purported enlightened benevolence.
By the start of the Civil War, the South was producing 75 percent of the
world’s cotton and creating more millionaires per capita than anywhere else
in the nation. 93 Slavery was such an efficient wealth generator that “[i]f the
Confederacy had been a separate nation, it would have ranked as the fourth
richest in the world at the start of the Civil War.” 94 Mississippi’s declaration
of secession was not too far off when it named American chattel slavery as “the
greatest material interest of the world.” 95 Slavery made southern whites rich.
And the South was the engine of the Union’s economy.
In light of its outsized importance to the South’s economy, slavery and the
beliefs that supported it were woven into the fabric of the South’s way of life. 96
By the beginning of the Civil War, the southern slave population was close to
four million, and there were no white southerners alive who remembered a
time before American chattel slavery. 97 According to the 1860 census, in the
states that seceded from the Union, more than 32 percent of white families
owned slaves on average. 98 Slavery was so accepted that white families who

91. Genesis 9:25 (King James).
92. See generally DAVID M. GOLDENBERG, THE CURSE OF HAM: RACE AND SLAVERY IN
EARLY JUDAISM, CHRISTIANITY, AND ISLAM (2003) (arguing that there is no evidence of antiBlack racism in biblical and postbiblical Judaism and that the idea of Black inferiority developed
as Black people were enslaved in different cultures).
93. Greg Timmons, How Slavery Became the Economic Engine of the South, HISTORY
(Sept. 2, 2020), https://www.history.com/news/slavery-profitable-southern-economy [perma.cc
/QRQ2-VSMF].
94. Id.
95. MISSISSIPPI DECLARATION, supra note 88.
96. See Roger L. Ransom, The Economics of the Civil War, EH.NET, https://eh.net/encyclopedia/the-economics-of-the-civil-war [perma.cc/KL3Z-KZF6] (describing the economic state of the South before and after the Civil War); Ta-Nehisi Coates, No, Lincoln Could
Not Have ‘Bought the Slaves’: For One Thing, There Wasn’t Enough Money, ATLANTIC (June
20, 2013), https://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2013/06/no-lincoln-could-not-havebought-the-slaves/277073 [perma.cc/R3YL-B56E].
97. See Black and Slave Population of the United States from 1790 to 1880, STATISTA,
https://www.statista.com/statistics/1010169/black-and-slave-population-us-1790-1880
[perma.cc/EH6P-3KM9].
98. Sarah Pruitt, 5 Myths About Slavery, HISTORY (Jun. 23, 2020), https://www.history.com/news/5-myths-about-slavery [perma.cc/H75G-HH4Z]. Some states had far more slave
owners (46 percent in South Carolina, 49 percent in Mississippi), while some had far less (20
percent in Arkansas). Id.; see Jamelle Bouie & Rebecca Onion, Slavery Myths: Seven Lies, Halftruths, and Irrelevancies People Trot Out About Slavery—Debunked, SLATE (Sept. 29, 2015, 2:37
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could not afford slaves hoped to own slaves “in the same way that, today, most
Americans want to own a home.” 99 In other words, the South was “a slave
society, not just a society with slaves.” 100
The paradox of enshrining liberty as the bedrock principle of a nation that
so widely profited from depriving liberty was glaring and widely discussed. 101
Alexis de Tocqueville noted that by 1840, slavery seemed to be on the wane in
some parts of the United States but that “the prejudice to which it has given
birth is unmoving.” 102 That prejudice was rooted in the two beliefs that formed
the mainspring of the myths justifying Black enslavement: intellectual inferiority and criminality.
1.

The Myth of Black Intellectual Inferiority

In an effort to entrench the southern racial caste system, educated white
slave owners passed antiliteracy laws as prophylactic measures, sometimes in
the aftermath of violent rebellions, to frustrate attempts to organize resistance.
On September 9, 1739, a group of slaves in South Carolina tried to escape to
Florida. 103 The attempt, later called the Stono Rebellion, would be the largest
slave revolt in the history of the thirteen colonies. 104 “More than twenty white
Carolinians and nearly twice as many [B]lack Carolinians were killed before
the rebellion was suppressed.” 105 The slaves, many of whom had learned to
fight in the Yamasee War or from “their experience in their homes in Angola,
where they . . . had been trained in the use of weapons,” placed the white victims’ heads on the front steps of a warehouse for all to see. 106 As they progressed through the countryside chanting “Lukango,” Kikongo for “liberty,”
many enslaved people joined them, so that the twenty original rebels became
one hundred strong. 107 They fought off the white colonists for a week before
the rebellion was put down. 108 There was another uprising the next year as

PM), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2015/09/slavery-myths-seven-lies-half-truths-and-irrelevancies-people-trot-out-about-slavery-debunked.html [perma.cc/U9RS-ZJ9S].
99. Bouie & Onion, supra note 98.
100. Id. (emphasis omitted) (drawing on the work of Ira Berlin).
101. See, e.g., Edmund S. Morgan, Slavery and Freedom: The American Paradox, 59 J. AM.
HIST. 5 (1972).
102. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 329 (Harvey C. Mansfield &
Delba Winthrop eds. & trans., Univ. of Chi. Press 2000) (1835–1840).
103. HERBERT APTHEKER, AMERICAN NEGRO SLAVE REVOLTS 187–88 (50th anniversary
ed. 1993).
104. Henry Louis Gates, Jr., 100 Amazing Facts About the Negro: Did African American
Slaves Rebel?, PBS, https://www.pbs.org/wnet/african-americans-many-rivers-to-cross/history
/did-african-american-slaves-rebel [perma.cc/9WGE-5JRJ].
105. Today in History - September 9: The Stono Rebellion, LIBR. OF CONG., https://www.loc
.gov/item/today-in-history/september-09 [perma.cc/B2L2-R6BW].
106. Gates, supra note 104.
107. Id.
108. Id.
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well, in which South Carolina executed fifty more slaves, a sizeable loss of
wealth that must have been difficult for the state to bear. 109
The South Carolina legislature, suspecting that the rebellious slaves had
communicated in writing, swung into action and passed the Negro Act of
1740. 110 Warning that slave literacy “may be attended with great inconveniences,” the Act made teaching any slave to write or employing any slave in
writing illegal. 111 Sixty years later, the legislature passed a new statute because
the 1740 law had not “ke[pt] [B]lacks in ‘due subordination.’ ” 112 The revised
Act outlawed any “mental instruction,” including reading and writing, of enslaved and free Black people. 113
As more uprisings occurred, 114 other states followed suit. In September
1829, David Walker, a Black man whose father was a slave and whose mother
was free, wrote his Appeal to the Coloured Citizens of the World, a pamphlet
that aimed to incite Black people to take up arms against slavery and slave
owners. 115 The Virginia legislature prohibited enslaved and free Black people
from learning to read and write in the aftermath of Nat Turner’s Rebellion in
1831. 116 Missouri and Mississippi also prohibited schools for enslaved and free
Black people. 117 Between 1829 and 1834, Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, and
North Carolina all enacted legislation making it illegal for slaves to learn to

109. Id.
110. See HEATHER ANDREA WILLIAMS, SELF-TAUGHT: AFRICAN AMERICAN EDUCATION
IN SLAVERY AND FREEDOM 13 (Waldo E. Martin Jr. & Patricia Sullivan eds., 2005).
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. There were approximately 250 slave uprisings in the South, many of which were inspired by the Haitian Revolution. Gates, supra note 104. Led by Touissant Louverture, the Haitian Revolution was a terrifying cautionary tale for slave owners and a source of inspiration for
the enslaved in the young Union. Id.
115. Walker wrote:
The man who would not fight under our Lord and Master Jesus Christ, in the glorious
and heavenly cause of freedom and of God—to be delivered from the most wretched,
abject and servile slavery, that ever a people was afflicted with since the foundation of the
world, to the present day—ought to be kept with all of his children or family, in slavery,
or in chains, to be butchered by his cruel enemies.

DAVID WALKER, APPEAL IN FOUR ARTICLES, TOGETHER WITH A PREAMBLE TO THE COLOURED
CITIZENS OF THE WORLD, BUT IN PARTICULAR AND VERY EXPRESSLY TO THOSE OF THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA 15 (Boston, David Walker 1829).
116. JANET DUITSMAN CORNELIUS, “WHEN I CAN READ MY TITLE CLEAR”: LITERACY,
SLAVERY, AND RELIGION IN THE ANTEBELLUM SOUTH 33 (1991). Nat Turner’s Rebellion, on August 22, 1831, ended after two months, the deaths of between fifty-five and sixty White people,
and Turner’s capture and vicious execution. Turner was also literate. Gates, supra note 104.
117. An Act Respecting Negroes and Mulattoes (1847), in LAWS OF THE STATE OF
MISSOURI PASSED AT THE FIRST SESSION OF THE FOURTEENTH GENERAL ASSEMBLY 103–04 (n.p.,
James Lusk 1847); see WILLIAMS, supra note 110, at 18 (describing punishments for learning to
read and write in Mississippi).
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read and write. 118 By the time of the Civil War, “[i]t was illegal in all but three
slave-sanctioning states—Arkansas, Kentucky, and Tennessee—for African
Americans, free or enslaved, to assemble for school purposes and for enslaved
African Americans to learn how to read or write.” 119
And these laws were enforced. Former slaves frequently described being
punished for reading. As Belle Butler, who grew up as a slave in North Carolina, remarked,
No slave was ever allowed to look at a book, for fear he might learn to read.
One day the old mistress caught a slave boy with a book, she cursed him and
asked him what he meant, and what he thought he could do with a book. She
said he looked like a black dog with a breast pin on, and forbade him to ever
look into a book again. 120

Similarly, John W. Fields, who was enslaved in Indiana, reported,
In most of us colored folks was the great desire to [be] able to read and write.
We took advantage of every opportunity to educate ourselves. The greater
part of the plantation owners were very harsh if we were caught trying to
learn or write. It was the law that if a white man was caught trying to educate
a negro slave, he was liable to prosecution entailing a fine of fifty dollars and
a jail sentence. . . . Our ignorance was the greatest hold the South had on us.
We knew we could run away, but what then? 121

There are also many instances of former slaves lamenting not being able to
learn to read or write. According to Lissie Johnson, who was enslaved in Indiana, “The thing these early settlers wanted most, was for their children to learn
to read and write. So many of them had been caught trying to learn to write,
and had had their thumbs mashed, so they would not be able to hold a pencil.” 122 Adeline Blakeley, enslaved in Arkansas, told her interviewer that “it
sounds funny, but if I had a million dollars I would give it gladly to be able to
read and write letters to my friends.” 123
The antiliteracy laws worked. By the Civil War, only 5 to 10 percent of the
South’s four million slaves were literate. 124 The desperate fear of Black insurrections and the need to deprive Black people of the ability to communicate
to coordinate rebellions came first; the state’s imprimatur in the form of laws
forbidding Black literacy came second. Together, the two seeded the myth of
Black intellectual inferiority.

118. WILLIAMS, supra note 110, at 13–16.
119. See Christopher M. Span, Post-slavery? Post-segregation? Post-racial? A History of the
Impact of Slavery, Segregation, and Racism on the Education of African Americans, 114 NAT’L
SOC’Y FOR STUDY EDUC., no. 2, 2015, at 53, 56.
120. 2 SLAVE NARRATIVES: A FOLK HISTORY IN THE UNITED STATES FROM INTERVIEWS
WITH FORMER SLAVES 41 (1941).
121. 5 id. at 78.
122. Id. at 115.
123. 2 id. at 183.
124. Span, supra note 119, at 56.
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The Myth of Black Dangerousness

Slave rebellions were also a source of beliefs about Black criminality.
American chattel slavery was more than just a brutal means to a lucrative end.
The “peculiar institution” was an entire worldview, built upon a Daedalean and
near-indestructible alloy of individual, institutional, and structural racism. 125
The relationship between slave owners and the enslaved was “characterized by
a paternalistic combination of hegemonic cultural control and violent discipline that was supposed to extract not only obedience but even consent from
enslaved people.” 126 In spite of how panoramic this worldview was for white
people, there was a constant strain of resistance from Black people. The major
antislavery rebellions produced large-scale changes, like antiliteracy 127 and guncontrol legislation. 128 But there were also smaller acts of resistance.
In the vast spectrum between consent and open rebellion 129 fell countless
moments of defiance. “Theft, foot dragging, short-term flight, and feigning illness were commonplace acts in the Old South and are widely understood to be
everyday forms of resistance—hidden or indirect expressions of dissent, quiet
ways of reclaiming a measure of control over goods, time, or parts of one’s life.”130
Because compliance was a prerequisite of chattel slavery, these acts of resistance assumed an outsized significance. They threatened to disrupt not only
crop production but an entire way of life. Consider the findings of Samuel
Cartwright, a widely published white doctor who practiced throughout the
South. In the 1850s, Cartwright diagnosed enslaved Black Americans with two
diseases that make sense only in light of the belief that Black people were
meant to be subservient to white people. 131 The first was “drapetomania,” a

125. “Individual racism refers to an individual’s racist assumptions, beliefs or behaviours and
is ‘a form of racial discrimination that stems from conscious and unconscious, personal prejudice.’ ” Institutional racism is “[r]acial discrimination that derives from individuals carrying out the
dictates of others who are prejudiced or of a prejudiced society.” And structural racism refers to
“inequalities rooted in the system-wide operation of a society that excludes substantial numbers
of members of particular groups from significant participation in major social institutions.” Forms
of Racism: Individual vs. Systemic, ALBERTA C.L. RSCH. CTR., http://www.aclrc.com/forms-of-racism [perma.cc/2WZV-8KE8].
126. STEPHANIE M.H. CAMP, CLOSER TO FREEDOM: ENSLAVED WOMEN AND EVERYDAY
RESISTANCE IN THE PLANTATION SOUTH 3 (2004).
127. See supra Section I.A.1.
128. See Clayton E. Cramer, The Racist Roots of Gun Control, 4 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 17,
23 (1994).
129. JAMES C. SCOTT, DOMINATION AND THE ARTS OF RESISTANCE 136 (1990).
130. CAMP, supra note 126, at 2. “Foot dragging” is defined in this context as slaves
“slow[ing] down the pace of their labor,” sometimes during a “critical time” like at harvest or
just before the first frost, to cause slave owners to lose money. 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SLAVE
RESISTANCE AND FREEDOM: A-N, at xxxiv (Junius P. Rodriguez ed., 2007).
131. See Samuel Cartwright, Diseases and Peculiarities of the Negro Race, 11 DEBOW’S S. &
W. REV. 331 (1851).
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mental illness that caused slaves to run away. 132 The second, “dysaethesia aethiopica,” supposedly caused “rascality” or laziness in Black people and was
“the natural offspring of negro liberty—the liberty to be idle, to wallow in filth,
and to indulge in improper food and drinks.” 133 In the context of chattel slavery, Black people’s completely logical reactions to their brutal treatment and
subjugation—running away and refusing to work—became symptoms of
mental illness and criminality.
Chattel slavery’s enforcement mechanisms outlived the system’s demise.
On the plantation, disciplining of enslaved people had largely been the province of individual slave owners. Discipline encompassed everything from casual meanness to unspeakable violence. Any measure of Black defiance
demanded a swift and crippling response. Statutes had given slave owners
near-absolute control over their slaves—including the power to kill them. 134
But once chattel slavery was legally prohibited, slaveholders saw much of their
“power[] . . . ascribed to the state.” 135
Slave patrols—roving bands that hunted, retrieved, and punished runaway
slaves with the sanction of the law—evolved into the South’s first police
forces. 136 The police enforced vagrancy laws 137 and nighttime curfews, 138 wielding the imprimatur of the state as their most effective weapon. As one former
slave from North Carolina recalled long after slavery had ended, slave patrols
had been “jes’ like policemen, only worser.” 139 Unsurprisingly, there was then,
and continues to be now, overlap between southern police forces and the Ku
Klux Klan and other paramilitary groups dedicated to the idea that “terror [wa]s
the only restraining influence that can be brought to bear upon vicious Negroes.” 140
The idea that any measure of Black defiance was to be met with brutality
extended well past the end of slavery and into the first half of the twentieth
132. Id.
133. Id. at 333.
134. See, e.g., CODE NOIR, art. XXXIII (Fr. La. 1685); Act of May 10, 1740, No. 760, art.
XXIV, reprinted in 7 THE STATUTES AT LARGE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 397 (David J. McCord ed.,
Charleston, S.C., A.S. Johnston 1840); Act Concerning Servants and Slaves, ch. 49, art. XXXIV,
reprinted in 3 WILLIAM WALLER HENING, THE STATUTES AT LARGE; BEING A COLLECTION OF
ALL THE LAWS OF VIRGINIA 447, 461 (Philadelphia, Thomas Desilver 2d ed. 1823).
135. CAMP, supra note 126, at 2–3.
136. SALLY E. HADDEN, SLAVE PATROLS: LAW AND VIOLENCE IN VIRGINIA AND THE
CAROLINAS 3–4 (2001).
137. NATAPOFF, supra note 59, at 154–55 (describing the racist history of vagrancy laws).
138. JAMES FORMAN, JR., LOCKING UP OUR OWN: CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN BLACK
AMERICA 95 (2017).
139. HADDEN, supra note 136, at 71.
140. JAMES ELBERT CUTLER, LYNCH-LAW: AN INVESTIGATION INTO THE HISTORY OF
LYNCHING IN THE UNITED STATES 274 (1905); see GILBERT KING, DEVIL IN THE GROVE:
THURGOOD MARSHALL, THE GROVELAND BOYS, AND THE DAWN OF A NEW AMERICA 17, 91, 139–
41 (2012). For a discussion of the prevalence of white supremacy in modern-day police forces, see
Vida B. Johnson, The Epidemic of White Supremacist Police, APPEAL (Aug. 7, 2017), https://theappeal.org/the-epidemic-of-white-supremacist-police-4992cb7ad97a [perma.cc/8Z55-Q22Y].
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century. After Reconstruction’s end, violence in general, and lynching in particular, became an indispensable tool in maintaining the racial caste system
that had served the white South’s economic interests for well over a century. 141
For southern whites, lynchings were “festive community gatherings” at which
“large crowds of whites watched and participated in the Black victims’ prolonged torture, mutilation, dismemberment, and burning at the stake.” 142 For
Black southerners, lynching was “a tactic for maintaining racial control by victimizing the entire African American community, not merely punishment of
an alleged perpetrator for a crime.” 143
Here again, the myth of Black criminality crumbles, as the range of pretextual excuses for racial violence was so broad as to be capricious. 144 “Of the
4,084 African American lynching victims . . . nearly 25 percent were accused
of sexual assault and nearly 30 percent were accused of murder.” 145 Hundreds

141. Relying on accounts from local newspapers, historical archives, court records, interviews with local historians, survivors, victims’ descendants, and contemporaneously published
reports in African American newspapers and periodicals, the Equal Justice Initiative has catalogued over four thousand racial terror lynchings in twelve states across the South between the
end of Reconstruction in 1877 and 1950. EQUAL JUST. INITIATIVE, LYNCHING IN AMERICA:
CONFRONTING THE LEGACY OF RACIAL TERROR 4, 40 (3d ed. 2017) [hereinafter LYNCHING IN
AMERICA]. This represents at least eight hundred more lynchings in these states than had previously been counted. Id. at 4. In other words, there were an average of fifty-six lynchings a year
across the South over the course of seventy-three years. Id. at 40. These do not include the countless threatened reprisals, cross-burnings, beatings, and other forms of terrorism visited upon
Black people during this period. For example, Professor James Forman, Jr., recounts a story from
his father’s childhood growing up in Jim Crow Mississippi. In 1936, Forman’s father, then eight
years old, failed to answer “Yes, ma’am” to a store clerk. White men in the store threatened to
lynch the little boy if his uncle brought him into town again. FORMAN, supra note 138, at 8.
142. LYNCHING IN AMERICA, supra note 141, at 28. At some lynchings, pieces of the lynching
victim’s corpse or pictures of the victim’s mutilated corpse were sold as “souvenirs.” Id. at 33, 47.
143. Id. at 5. White people who bucked the social order were also lynched. Id. at 27. However, as the postslavery decades wore on, lynching became more and more racialized. As the
Equal Justice Initiative explains:
By the end of the nineteenth century, Southern lynching had become a tool of racial control that terrorized and targeted African Americans. The ratio of Black lynching victims
to white lynching victims was 4 to 1 from 1882 to 1889; increased to more than 6 to 1
between 1890 and 1900; and soared to more than 17 to 1 after 1900.

Id.
144. Equal Justice Initiative researchers found that most lynchings fell into the following
categories:
(1) lynchings that resulted from a wildly distorted fear of interracial sex;
(2) lynchings in response to casual social transgressions;
(3) lynchings based on allegations of serious violent crime;
(4) public spectacle lynchings;
(5) lynchings that escalated into large-scale violence targeting the entire African American community; and
(6) lynchings of sharecroppers, ministers, and community leaders who resisted mistreatment, which were most common between 1915 and 1940.

Id. at 5.
145.

Id. at 29 (footnotes omitted).
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of others were lynched based on accusations of arson, robbery, assault, and
vagrancy. 146 Others were lynched on accusations of behavior that contravened
the rigid customs and expectations of the South’s social caste system, like not
addressing a white man or white woman with proper respect. 147 Still others
were lynched because they were Black and in the wrong place at the wrong
time—in the path of the mob when the target of the mob’s anger could not be
found. 148
Examples overwhelm. In 1908, in Hickman, Kentucky, David Walker, his
wife, and their four children were lynched when Mr. Walker was accused of
using inappropriate language with a white woman. 149 In 1930, in Thomasville,
Georgia, Lacy Mitchell was lynched for testifying against a white man accused
of raping an African American woman. 150 In 1940, in Luverne, Alabama, Jesse
Thornton was lynched for referring to a white police officer with the officer’s
name without the title “Mister.” 151 In 1941, in Camp Blanding, Florida, a Black
construction worker was lynched for asking a white coworker to return the
Black worker’s shovel. 152 And Senator Ben ‘Pitchfork’ Tillman of South Carolina bragged that he and his Red Shirts, a paramilitary group that aimed to
undermine Black political power, “ha[d] done [their] level best” to disenfranchise former slaves by any means they could imagine, including shooting
them. 153 “We have scratched our head to figure out how we can eliminate the
last one of them. We stuffed ballot boxes. We shot them [Negroes]. WE ARE
NOT ASHAMED OF IT.” 154
3.

The Myths Take Hold

These mythologies remained so deeply rooted as southern values that they
were codified into law. In Plessy v. Ferguson, which upheld the constitutionality of de jure racial segregation in the form of “separate but equal” public facilities and laid the legal foundation for the American system of apartheid that
would become known as Jim Crow, Justice Harlan wrote in dissent:
The white race deems itself to be the dominant race in this country. And
so it is, in prestige, in achievements, in education, in wealth and in power.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Holland Cotter, A Memorial to the Lingering Horror of Lynching, N.Y. TIMES (June 1,
2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/01/arts/design/national-memorial-for-peace-andjustice-montgomery-alabama.html [perma.cc/3257-CKKX].
150. LYNCHING IN AMERICA, supra note 141, at 32.
151. Id.
152. Scott Dickman, My Turn: ‘The Legacy of Suffering and Injustice That Haunts Us,’
CONCORD MONITOR (June 7, 2020, 7:00 AM), https://www.concordmonitor.com/Racial-injustice-in-America-34614805 [perma.cc/XY9L-UE5E].
153. FORMAN, supra note 138, at 66; Ben Tillman, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA (Mar. 29,
2021), https://www.britannica.com/biography/Benjamin-R-Tillman [perma.cc/A5J3-ETWT].
154. FORMAN, supra note 138, at 66 (alteration in original).
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So, I doubt not, it will continue to be for all time, if it remains true to its great
heritage and holds fast to the principles of constitutional liberty. But in view
of the Constitution, in the eye of the law, there is in this country no superior,
dominant, ruling class of citizens. There is no caste here. Our Constitution is
color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens. In respect of civil rights, all citizens are equal before the law. The humblest is the
peer of the most powerful. The law regards man as man, and takes no account of his surroundings or of his color when his civil rights as guaranteed
by the supreme law of the land are involved. It is, therefore, to be regretted
that this high tribunal, the final expositor of the fundamental law of the land,
has reached the conclusion that it is competent for a State to regulate the
enjoyment by citizens of their civil rights solely upon the basis of race. 155

The sentence in which Justice Harlan describes the Constitution as colorblind is immediately preceded by his endorsement of White America’s “great
heritage” in having earned its status as the “dominant race,” not just in 1896,
but “for all time.” 156 The ease of the juxtaposition is striking. Though it would
seem that the reality that the “white race” was “dominant” in “prestige, in
achievements, in education, in wealth and in power” would gainsay the ideal
that the Constitution holds “all citizens [as] equal before the law,” in Harlan’s
dissent, and in the community conscience of white Americans, these two principles coexisted. 157 The paradox was resolved thusly: white Americans were the
dominant race because of their innate superiority, even if that status was acquired by subjugating other races through sedulously enforced social norms,
arbitrary and brutal violence, 158 and vicious curtailments of civil rights. 159

155. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
Justice Harlan likely borrowed the “color blind” descriptor from the brief filed on behalf of
Plessy. In the brief, Plessy’s attorney argued, “[j]ustice is pictured blind and her daughter, the
Law, ought at least to be color-blind.” C. Vann Woodward, Plessy v. Ferguson: The Birth of Jim
Crow, AM. HERITAGE, Apr. 1964, at 52, 100–01.
156. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 559 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
157. Id.
158. LYNCHING IN AMERICA, supra note 141, at 33, 60 (stating that lynchings were public
spectacles with a carnival atmosphere).
159. Jim Crow is most often associated with segregation of public facilities, like buses,
trains, parks, public drinking fountains, and lunch counters. See James W. Fox Jr., Intimations
of Citizenship: Repressions and Expressions of Equal Citizenship in the Era of Jim Crow, 50 HOW.
L.J. 113, 138 (2006) (“Racial subordination and segregation in public facilities, and especially in
the most common facilities of railroads, streetcars, inns, and theaters, was one of the most pervasive ways in which [w]hites asserted their racial power.”). But Jim Crow laws were meticulous
and comprehensive in their scope, reaching beyond public facilities to regulate the most intimate
of interactions. For example, a 1930 Alabama statute made it “unlawful for a negro and white
person to play together or in company with each other in any game of cards or dice, dominoes
or checkers,” a 1903 Arkansas provision made it unlawful “for any white prisoner to be handcuffed or otherwise chained or tied to a negro prisoner,” and a 1926 Georgia statue prohibited
“colored barber[s]” from “serv[ing] as a barber to white women or girls.” Separate Is Not Equal:
Brown v. Board of Education, NAT’L MUSEUM OF AM. HIST., https://americanhistory.si.edu/brown/history/1-segregated/detail/jim-crow-laws.html [perma.cc/C5G3-2DC5]. As
C. Vann Woodward explained, Jim Crow
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For many Black Americans, however, Harlan’s promise of equality before
the law became a rallying principle. Jim Crow would stand as the law of the
land for the next sixty years, until the Supreme Court ruled in Brown v. Board
of Education that “[s]eparate” was “inherently unequal.” 160 Even after the
Court’s rebuke of “separate but equal” cut Jim Crow off at the knees, these
myths were so deeply held that Jim Crow’s shadow would continue to loom
large almost a century after the end of slavery. 161 Not only would Black people
still have far fewer educational opportunities than white people in the 1960s,
but Black people would also begin to fill the nation’s jails and prisons at an
unprecedented rate. 162 These deeply ingrained stereotypes concerning Black
intellectual inferiority and Black criminality, which evolved over centuries to
justify the particularly virulent American strain of chattel slavery, had taken
on a life of their own. 163
Restlessness in Black communities at the intractableness of these narratives, their abiding affront to the collective dignity of the Black community,
the constant threats of violence they justified, the limits they imposed on the
promise of opportunity, and the enormous removal of wealth from the Black
community that they enabled would fuel the mass protests of the African
American civil rights movement of the 1960s and lead to the passage of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964. 164 The intractability of these beliefs is not surprising.

lent the sanction of law to a racial ostracism that extended to churches and schools, to
housing and jobs, to eating and drinking. . . . [T]hat ostracism eventually extended to virtually all forms of public transportation, to sports and recreations, to hospitals, orphanages, prisons, and asylums, and ultimately to funeral homes, morgues, and cemeteries.

C. VANN WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW 8 (1955). Jim Crow laws also prohibited interracial marriage, Black fishers from fishing with white fishers, Black people from using
the same bathrooms as white people, and more. See Examples of Jim Crow Laws, JIM CROW
MUSEUM OF RACIST MEMORABILIA, https://www.ferris.edu/HTMLS/news/jimcrow/links
/misclink/examples.htm [perma.cc/VN7W-P4BN].
160. 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).
161. See ANDERS WALKER, THE GHOST OF JIM CROW: HOW SOUTHERN MODERATES USED
BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION TO STALL CIVIL RIGHTS 3–4 (2009).
162. See Ta-Nehisi Coates, The Black Family in the Age of Mass Incarceration, ATLANTIC
(Oct. 2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2015/10/the-black-family-in-the-ageof-mass-incarceration/403246 [perma.cc/92BV-SAH4]; Linda Darling-Hammond, Unequal Opportunity: Race and Education, BROOKINGS INST. (Mar. 1, 1998), https://www.brookings.edu/articles/unequal-opportunity-race-and-education [perma.cc/A6PB-953S].
163. U.S. chattel slavery was different from other forms of slavery practiced in Africa. See
Robert Harms, An Ancient Practice Transformed by the Arrival of Europeans, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 20,
2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/an-ancient-practice-transformed-by-the-arrival-of-europeans-11568993153 [perma.cc/B973-TFQK]; see also Modern Abolition, NAT’L UNDERGROUND R.R.
FREEDOM CTR., https://freedomcenter.org/learn/modern-day-abolition [perma.cc/F99C-B3CP].
164. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). Title VI of the Act prohibits recipients of federal funding, including private colleges and universities, from discriminating against students and applicants on
the basis of race, religion, or national origin; Title VII proscribes discrimination on the basis of
race or national origin in private employment and is one of the sources of the term “affirmative
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“[R]acialized scripts become hidden in the contours of justice,” embedded in
their own cultural ecosystem. 165 Far from being deliberately hidden by racists
with malevolent intent, they instead evolve from practice, to belief, to the way
things are. 166 In this way, “racism can infiltrate seemingly race-neutral institutions,” 167 even in the face of a Constitution that cannot tolerate prejudices. 168
B. The Birth of Affirmative Action: Affirmative Action and De Jure
Segregation
Because the law was the instrument that reified these narratives, the law
was the venue in which equality advocates chose to confront them. Unfortunately, in the hands of the Court, the law would ultimately be too easily sanitized of the stereotypes, customs, and lived experience that made it such an
effective weapon for discrimination. Brown would be the first step toward affirmative action in higher education, requiring schools to take the affirmative
action of desegregating. 169 Amelioration of de jure segregation—or the mandatory use of race as a factor in admissions by public education systems to
eliminate the vestiges of historically lawful racial segregation—is the original
meaning of affirmative action in higher education. 170 The South’s history of
de jure segregation created an affirmative obligation for the states to address
the effects of decades of legally imposed racial segregation in schools. 171
Brown was the apotheosis of a decades-long litigation strategy. Instead of
focusing on the fact that educational facilities were functionally unequal, as
prior cases had done, Brown located its impermissible constitutional infirmity
in the fact that school children were separated on the basis of race. 172 Even if
racially segregated educational facilities offered the same education, the Court
wrote, “[t]o separate [children] from others of similar age and qualifications
solely because of their race generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status
in the community that may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely
ever to be undone.” 173
By requiring schools to desegregate, the Court did something it had not
done before: it imposed upon white Americans the obligation to get proximate
action.” Martha S. West, The Historical Roots of Affirmative Action, 10 LA RAZA L.J. 607, 610–
11, 619 (1998).
165. NICOLE GONZALEZ VAN CLEVE, CROOK COUNTY: RACISM AND INJUSTICE IN
AMERICA’S LARGEST CRIMINAL COURT 12 (2016).
166. See id. at 9–12 (describing the racialized courtroom as “business as usual”).
167. Id. at 11.
168. Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433 (1984) (“The Constitution cannot control such
prejudices but neither can it tolerate them. Private biases may be outside the reach of the law,
but the law cannot, directly or indirectly, give them effect.”).
169. Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown I), 347 U.S. 483, 493–95 (1954).
170. See United States v. Fordice, 505 U.S. 717, 721–23 (1992).
171. See id. at 721.
172. Brown I, 347 U.S. at 491–93.
173. Id. at 494.
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to the issue of race relations. Proximity here, and in the way Professor Bryan
Stevenson uses the term, 174 required more than surface-level engagement with
the “problem we all live with.” 175 It required a collective acceptance that de jure
segregation was deeply damaging to both Black and white Americans, that
everyone touched by it had an obligation to remedy the harm it wrought, and
that remedying that harm would happen only through widespread, cross-racial cooperation. 176 In other words, the Court’s desegregation order was radical
not just because it offended centuries of southern tradition but because of the
way it aimed to disrupt that tradition. Desegregation had the potential to start
the rewriting of the obstinate, pernicious narratives about Black intellectual
inferiority that had justified depriving generations of enslaved Black people of
education altogether and then ensured that generations of Black Americans
could not access education that matched their talent and potential. 177
C. Affirmative Action and De Facto Segregation
By 1961, states were grappling with implementing the Court’s ruling in
Brown. 178 In 1955, Emmett Till, a fourteen-year-old African American boy
visiting his family in Money, Mississippi, was brutally lynched for allegedly
saying “Bye, baby” to a white woman. 179 The publication of the photos taken
at Till’s open-casket funeral was the first media event of the civil rights movement. 180 The Montgomery bus boycott, the country’s first large-scale protest

174. See Fortune Mag., The Power of Proximity: CEO Initiative 2018, YOUTUBE (June 27,
2018), https://youtu.be/1RyAwZIHo4Y.
175. Norman Rockwell, The Problem We All Live With, oil on canvas (1964),
http://www.nrm.org/thinglink/text/ProblemLiveWith.html [perma.cc/XS4S-5RCF].
176. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown II), 349 U.S. 294, 300–01 (1955); see also Brown I,
347 U.S. at 495–96.
177. Before the civil rights movement, racial and ethnic minorities were largely excluded
from accessing higher education and the social and economic benefits that accompany advanced
degrees. DOUGLAS S. MASSEY, CAMILLE Z. CHARLES, GARVEY F. LUNDY & MARY J. FISCHER, THE
SOURCE OF THE RIVER: THE SOCIAL ORIGINS OF FRESHMEN AT AMERICA’S SELECTIVE COLLEGES
AND UNIVERSITIES 1 (2003) (“African Americans, in particular, were barred from most colleges
and universities by a combination of de jure and de facto mechanisms, and they faced particularly
severe barriers at the nation’s most selective institutions.”). Born of segregation, historically Black
colleges and universities shouldered the responsibility of educating Black intellectuals. See id.
178. See generally WITH ALL DELIBERATE SPEED: IMPLEMENTING BROWN V. BOARD OF
EDUCATION (Brian J. Daugherity & Charles C. Bolton eds., 2008) (surveying the implementation
of Brown’s desegregation mandate in a variety of states).
179. Wade Goodwyn, A Brutal Lynching and a Possible Confession, Decades Later, NPR
(Oct. 27, 2018, 8:13 AM), https://www.npr.org/2018/10/27/661048613/a-brutal-lynching-anda-possible-confession-decades-later [perma.cc/N3U3-QHCF].
180. See Nation Horrified by Murder of Kidnaped Chicago Youth, JET, Sept. 5, 1955, at 6–9
(content warning: graphic imagery). The photos of Till’s remains were seared onto the consciousness of an entire generation of African Americans; Till’s casket and this article are now
housed in the National Museum of African American History and Culture. Abby Callard, Em-
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against segregation, ended in 1956 with the Supreme Court’s ordering Alabama to integrate its bus system and with the introduction of Martin Luther
King Jr. to the national stage. 181 In 1957, President Eisenhower sent federal
troops to escort the Little Rock Nine, the group of African American students
charged with integrating Central High School in Arkansas, past angry white
mobs resisting segregation; federal troops also escorted six-year-old Ruby
Bridges, who integrated William Frantz Elementary School in Louisiana. 182
And in February 1960, four African American college students from North
Carolina Agricultural and Technical State University, inspired by Dr. King
and his example of nonviolent civil disobedience, themselves inspired a wave
of sit-ins across the South when they refused to leave a whites-only lunch
counter at Woolworth’s without being served. 183
In response to this mounting unrest, President Kennedy threw the weight
of the executive branch behind the courts’ efforts to desegregate the South. 184
With Executive Order 10925, signed on March 6, 1961, President Kennedy
required that government contractors “take affirmative action to ensure that
applicants are employed and that employees are treated during employment
without regard to their race, creed, color, or national origin.” 185 President

mett Till’s Casket Goes to the Smithsonian, SMITHSONIAN (Nov. 2009), https://www.smithsonianmag.com/artsculture/emmett-tills-casket-goes-to-the-smithsonian-144696940
[perma.cc/43HL-K68C].
181. Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903 (1956) (per curiam); Robert Jerome Glennon, The Role
of Law in the Civil Rights Movement: The Montgomery Bus Boycott, 1955–1957, 9 LAW & HIST.
REV. 59, 60 (1991).
182. Alex Chadwick, Little Rock Remembers Troops’ Arrival, NPR (Sept. 24, 2007, 1:00
PM), https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=14654126 [perma.cc/V8RZ3DM4]. Ruby Bridges would later be the subject of a famous Norman Rockwell painting, “The
Problem We All Live With.” In the painting, six-year-old Ruby, in a white dress and pigtails, is
flanked by four members of the National Guard as she walks to school carrying her books. See
Rockwell, supra note 175.
183. Deidre B. Flowers, The Launching of the Student Sit-in Movement: The Role of Black
Women at Bennett College, 90 J. AFR. AM. HIST. 52, 53–55 (2005).
184. Cf. Judson MacLaury, President Kennedy’s E.O. 10925: Seedbed of Affirmative Action,
2 FED. HIST. 42, 44 (2010) (“The increasing use of ‘affirmative action’ as a term, and its adoption
as national policy in 1961, can be seen as responses to the more-than-affirmative assertions of their
rights that African Americans in large numbers were taking in the late 1950s and early 60s.”).
185. Exec. Order No. 10,925, 3 C.F.R. 448, 450 (1959–1963). President Kennedy’s executive
order was preceded by a series of executive orders forbidding race discrimination in employment
by federal contractors dating back to President Franklin Roosevelt. Signed on June 25, 1941,
Executive Order 8802 prohibited discrimination in the defense industry on the basis of “race,
creed, color, or national origin, in the firm belief that the democratic way of life within the Nation can be defended successfully only with the help and support of all groups within its borders.”
Exec. Order No. 8,802, 3 C.F.R. 957 (1938–1943). Executive Order 8802 was the first federal
action to endorse equal opportunity and to prohibit employment discrimination in the United
States. See West, supra note 164, at 612. President Roosevelt issued this order to ensure opportunities for Americans from Italy and Germany, who were targeted because of their ethnicities
in the leadup to and during World War II, and in response to pressure from African American
civil rights activists, including A. Phillip Randolph, who had threatened to stage a march on
Washington to protest the dearth of Black employees in the defense industry. See JOHN W.
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Kennedy’s order was the first to go beyond denouncing discrimination to requiring federal contractors to take affirmative steps to ensure nondiscrimination. 186 Though the order did include possible penalties for failure to comply,
it did not enumerate many specific requirements or provide examples of affirmative actions employers might take. 187
But President Kennedy’s executive order did little to quell the resistance
to desegregation sweeping across the South. In his inaugural address in 1963,
Alabama governor George Wallace earned national headlines, when, in defiance of federal law and in a ratification of white dominance reminiscent of
Justice Harlan’s dissent in Plessy, he declared, “[i]n the name of the greatest
people that have ever trod this earth, I draw the line in the dust and toss the
gauntlet before the feet of tyranny, and I say segregation now, segregation tomorrow, segregation forever.” 188 In May 1963, hundreds of African American
children marched through the streets of Birmingham, Alabama, protesting
segregation, only to be set upon by police batons, German Shepherds, and water cannons strong enough to dislodge bricks from buildings. 189 A month
later, Governor Wallace stood in the doorway of the Foster Auditorium at the
University of Alabama to prevent two African American students from entering. 190 The nationally televised brutality of the Children’s Crusade caused

JEFFRIES, WARTIME AMERICA: THE WORLD WAR II HOME FRONT 125–26 (1996). In 1948, President Harry Truman integrated the armed forces with Executive Order 9,981. Exec. Order No.
9,981, 3 C.F.R. 722 (1943–1948).
186. West, supra note 164, at 612.
187. Id. at 612–13.
188. Gov. George Wallace, Inaugural Address 2 (Jan. 14, 1963), https://digital.archives.alabama.gov/digital/api/collection/voices/id/2952 [perma.cc/L2VS-9RPD]. This phrase gained
Governor Wallace national coverage. It was covered in the New York Times, the Washington
Post, and Newsweek. North Denounced by Gov. Wallace, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 15, 1963, at 9; Alabama
Gov. Wallace Asserts South Will Elect Next President, WASH. POST, Jan. 15, 1963, at A4;
‘Now . . . Forever,’ NEWSWEEK, Jan. 28, 1963, at 31–32. It also earned Wallace the distinction of
being the only person mentioned (though not by name) in Dr. King’s famous “I Have a Dream”
speech at the March on Washington at the Lincoln Memorial in 1963. See Martin Luther King
Jr., I Have a Dream (Aug. 28, 1963).
189. See Steven Levingston, Children Have Changed America Before, Braving Fire Hoses
and Police Dogs for Civil Rights, WASH. POST (Mar. 23, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/retropolis/wp/2018/02/20/children-have-changed-america-before-bravingfire-hoses-and-police-dogs-for-civil-rights [perma.cc/M8YJ-VL72].
190. Debra Bell, George Wallace Stood in a Doorway at the University of Alabama 50 Years
Ago Today, U.S. NEWS (June 11, 2013, 2:05 PM), https://www.usnews.com/news/blogs/presspast/2013/06/11/george-wallace-stood-in-a-doorway-at-the-university-of-alabama-50-yearsago-today [perma.cc/3FJ8-AXE5]. This action was so prominent and symbolic that it was mentioned in Bob Dylan’s iconic 1964 song “The Times They Are A-Changin’.” See BOB DYLAN, THE
TIMES THEY ARE A-CHANGIN’ (Columbia Records 1964) (“Come Senators, congressmen, please
heed the call / Don’t stand in the doorway, don’t block up the hall.”).
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President Kennedy to send in the National Guard to desegregate the university. 191 In August 1963, 250,000 people gathered at the Lincoln Memorial for
the March on Washington for Jobs and Freedom, drawing hope from Dr.
King’s “I Have A Dream” speech at the close of the demonstration. 192 In September 1963, members of the Ku Klux Klan bombed the 16th Street Baptist
Church in Birmingham, killing four young African American girls, leading to
a rash of angry, anguished protests. 193 In November 1963, President Kennedy
was assassinated, and Lyndon B. Johnson was sworn in as President. 194
In his June 4, 1965 commencement address at Howard University, later
known as the “To Fulfill These Rights” speech, President Johnson famously stated:
[F]reedom is not enough. . . . You do not take a person who, for years, has
been hobbled by chains and liberate him, bring him up to the starting line of
a race and then say, ‘you are free to compete with all the others,’ and still
justly believe that you have been completely fair.
Thus it is not enough just to open the gates of opportunity. All our citizens must have the ability to walk through those gates. 195

President Johnson had made his announcement at a university commencement, and universities answered the call. Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 outlawed discrimination on the basis of race, color, or national origin by
any program or activity receiving federal financial assistance. 196 The sweep of
Title VI therefore included colleges and universities relying on federally
funded financial aid programs. In 1973, the Department of Health, Education,

191. Jeremy Gray, Kennedy Federalized National Guard to Integrate Alabama Public
Schools (Sept. 10, 1963), AL.COM (Mar. 6, 2019), https://www.al.com/birmingham-news-stories/2013/09/kennedy_federalized_national_g.html [perma.cc/J6XF-TJ5J].
192. March on Washington, HISTORY (Mar. 16, 2021), https://www.history.com/topics/blackhistory/march-on-washington [perma.cc/R7WT-9HED]. The March on Washington was the largest protest in U.S. history at the time. See Leeana Garfield, The 11 Biggest Marches and Protests in
American History, INSIDER (Feb. 8, 2017, 1:40 PM), https://www.businessinsider.com/largestmarches-us-history-2017-2 [perma.cc/9TP9-KKWE].
193. Birmingham Church Bombing, HISTORY, https://www.history.com/topics/1960s/birmingham-church-bombing [perma.cc/4HX7-8AN2].
194. Assassination of John F. Kennedy, HISTORY (June 14, 2019), https://www.history.com
/topics/us-presidents/jfk-assassination [perma.cc/B9XK-ZUR3].
195. Commencement Address at Howard University: “To Fulfill These Rights,” 1965 PUB.
PAPERS 635, 636 (June 4, 1965). This speech is “widely known as the intellectual framework for
affirmative action.” Pamela Kirkland, For Howard Grads, LBJ’s ‘To Fulfil These Rights’ Remarks Are
Still Relevant Half a Century Later, WASH. POST (June 4, 2015, 10:57 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/2015/06/04/for-howard-grads-lbjs-to-fulfill-these-rightsremarks-are-still-relevant-half-a-century-later [perma.cc/G5W9-HNDF]. Many teaching tools
use this race metaphor to great effect. See, e.g., Erica Pinto, The Unequal Opportunity Race,
YOUTUBE (Nov. 15, 2010), https://youtu.be/vX_Vzl-r8NY (illustrating the obstacles to equality
that affirmative action addresses).
196. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241, 252 (1964) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.) (“No person in the United States shall, on the ground
of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be
subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.”).
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and Welfare revised the implementing regulations for Title VI to authorize
“affirmative action” for the purpose of “overcom[ing] the effects of conditions
which resulted in limiting participation by persons of a particular race, color,
or national origin.” 197 To comply, colleges and universities devised and implemented affirmative action programs to increase student-of-color enrollment. 198 Just five years later, the first case testing the limits of race-conscious
admissions in higher education would reach the Supreme Court, coinciding
with the start of the mass incarceration boom that would incarcerate unprecedented numbers of Black and Latino Americans over the next five decades. 199
D. A Brief History of Disproportionate Minority Contact
1.

1972: The Boom Begins

As affirmative action evolved as a febrifuge for invidious race bias in employment and education, the criminal legal system emerged as a new situs of
racial oppression. From 1925, the first year the number of people in prison in
the United States was recorded, to 1974, the United States prison population
was relatively stable, increasing at a rate of about 1.8 percent annually. 200 In
that almost sixty-year time span, the incarceration rate rose from 79 inmates
per 100,000 people to 102 inmates per 100,000 people. 201 In 1973, the first year
Allan Paul Bakke applied to and was rejected by the medical school at the University of California, Davis, there were just over 200,000 people incarcerated
in state and federal prisons. 202 In 1974, the prison population began a steep

197. 45 C.F.R. § 80.3(b)(6) (2019). The HEW regulations required affirmative action to
remedy de jure segregation and encouraged affirmative action to address de facto segregation:
(i) In administering a program regarding which the recipient has previously discriminated against persons on the ground of race, color, or national origin, the recipient must
take affirmative action to overcome the effects of prior discrimination.
(ii) Even in the absence of such prior discrimination, a recipient in administering a program may take affirmative action to overcome the effects of conditions which resulted in
limiting participation by persons of a particular race, color, or national origin.

Id.
198. See Anemona Hartocollis, 50 Years of Affirmative Action: What Went Right, and What
It Got Wrong, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 30, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/30/us/affirmativeaction-50-years.html [perma.cc/YK8C-T5QB].
199. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978); Marc Mauer, The Causes
and Consequences of Prison Growth in the United States, in MASS IMPRISONMENT: SOCIAL
CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 13 (David Garland ed., 2001).
200. BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS
BULLETIN: PRISONERS, 1925–81, at 1 (1982), https://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=pbdetail&iid=3414 [perma.cc/RW9R-MPQV].
201. Id.
202. Id. at 2 tbl.1.
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rise, almost doubling in the next eight years. By 2013, the incarceration rate
had risen to 716 inmates per 100,000 people, an almost fivefold increase. 203
Perhaps surprisingly, the rising incarceration rate did not track crime
rates. Sociologists have long noted that punishment has more to do with social
control than with crime rates, and the United States is an example that proves
this rule. 204 The United States’ prison population has shown constant growth,
increasing “in years of rising crime and falling crime, in good economic times
and bad, during wartime and while we were at peace.” 205 The current violent
crime rate hovers around 1971 levels, when just under 200,000 people were
incarcerated, and around when the incarceration explosion started. 206 The
data also reveal that the increased reliance on incarceration did not cause the
decline in crime rates; 207 in fact, the prison population has continued to increase even after crime rates began to decline in the mid-1990s. 208
2.

Superpredators, Mandatory Minimums, and the War on Drugs

Rising crime levels in the previous decade propelled mid-1990s legislators
to embrace a false forecast of hardened criminals and a suite of tough-oncrime measures to stop them. An examination of the changes in procedures
for system-involved youth provides an illustrative case study. Juvenile arrests
for violent crimes and homicides increased sharply between 1986 and 1994. 209
In the grip of this climate of fear, academics, sociologists, and criminologists
hailed a coming generation of juvenile “super-predators,” 210 a new and vicious
breed of youth who would “kill, rape, maim, and steal without remorse.” 211
And those youths, because of the criminogenic factors that contributed to creating a superpredator, would most often have Black faces. 212 “My [B]lack
crime problem, and ours,” Professor DiIulio explained, “is that for most
Americans, especially for average white Americans . . . the fear is enormous
203. See id. at 1; ROY WALMSLEY, INT’L CTR. FOR PRISON STUD., WORLD PRISON
POPULATION LIST 1 (10th ed. 2013).
204. See, e.g., MICHAEL TONRY, THINKING ABOUT CRIME: SENSE AND SENSIBILITY IN
AMERICAN PENAL CULTURE 14 (2004) (“Governments decide how much punishment they want,
and these decisions are in no simple way related to crime rates.”).
205. AUSTIN ET AL., supra note 51, at 1.
206. See James Cullen, The History of Mass Incarceration: From Alexis de Tocqueville to
Ronald Reagan, the Forces That Have Shaped the Current State of Our Prison System., BRENNAN
CTR. FOR JUST. (July 20, 2018), https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/analysis-opinion/history-mass-incarceration [perma.cc/RZ94-J9KG].
207. See AUSTIN ET AL., supra note 51, at 5.
208. Id. at 4 fig.1.
209. Barry C. Feld, Unmitigated Punishment: Adolescent Criminal Responsibility and
LWOP Sentences, 10 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 11, 29 (2007).
210. John J. DiIulio, Jr., My Black Crime Problem, and Ours, CITY J., Spring 1996, at 14.
211. Id. at 18.
212. See WILLIAM J. BENNETT, JOHN J. DIIULIO, JR. & JOHN P. WALTERS, BODY COUNT:
MORAL POVERTY . . . AND HOW TO WIN AMERICA’S WAR AGAINST CRIME AND DRUGS 18–34
(1996) (discussing the perception of criminals as being Black).
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and largely justifiable, and the [B]lack kids who inspire the fear seem not
merely unrecognizable but alien.” 213
DiIulio’s philippic spread like a fever. He was the anti-Cassandra, making
false predictions that everyone heeded. National politicians courted the
“tough on crime” label by pressing for increased offender accountability. 214
State legislators, not to be outdone, passed “the broadest and most sustained
legislative crackdown ever on serious offenses committed by youth within the
jurisdictional ages of American Juvenile Courts.” 215 By 1997, new juvenile codes
also allowed youths to be tried as adults at younger ages and for more offenses. 216
States, in reactionary mode, passed a battery of procrustean approaches
to crime. 217 These included habitual-offender laws and statutes that targeted
recidivism by punishing people with two or more felony convictions with increased sentences up to and including life in prison. 218 The most infamous of

213. DiIulio, Jr., supra note 210, at 18. In an episode of HBO’s critically acclaimed series
The Wire, Poot, a young Black man who sells drugs, has an exchange that alludes to the superpredator rhetoric with Herc, a white police officer, and Carver, a Black police officer, who are
warning Poot to be careful:
HERC: Well, you best watch your ass. ‘Cause the slingers out here? They’re like the crack
babies’ babies.
POOT: Man, every year everybody’s like, “Yeah, these kids out here, they’re a new breed.
I ain’t never seen nothing like this before. This the end of the world now.”
CARVER: Look around, fuckhead. This seem like the dawn of a new day to you?

The Wire: All Due Respect (HBO television broadcast Sept. 26, 2004).
214. The response in New York City, home of the Central Park jogger attack, was particularly fervent and vitriolic. Donald Trump, then a private citizen, took out a full-page ad in the
New York Times calling for reinstatement of the death penalty. Donald J. Trump, Advertisement,
Bring Back the Death Penalty, Bring Back Our Police!, N.Y. TIMES, May 1, 1989, at A13. Manhattan Borough President and mayoral candidate David Dinkins proposed an “antiwilding law”
with increased penalties for anyone who committed a crime as part of a group. Michael Welch,
Eric A. Price & Nana Yankey, Moral Panic Over Youth Violence: Wilding and the Manufacture
of Menace in the Media, 34 YOUTH & SOC’Y 3, 9–10 (2002). Mayoral candidate Rudy Giuliani
argued for severe measures to “combat ‘mindless violence’ perpetrated by marauding gangs on
‘wilding’ sprees,” and Mayor Ed Koch advocated for expanding the “death penalty” to “incidents
of wilding.” Id. at 10.
215. Franklin E. Zimring, The 1990s Assault on Juvenile Justice: Notes from an Ideological
Battleground, 11 FED. SENT’G REP. 260, 260 (1999).
216. Barry C. Feld, Race, Youth Violence, and the Changing Jurisprudence of Waiver, 19
BEHAV. SCIS. & L. 3, 5 (2001) (discussing waiver laws and harsher sentences in juvenile courts
after the 1980s); see also Sara Sun Beale, You’ve Come a Long Way, Baby: Two Waves of Juvenile
Justice Reform as Seen from Jena, Louisiana, 44 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 511, 521 (2009).
217. See FORMAN, supra note 138, at 7.
218. See Ahmed A. White, The Juridical Structure of Habitual Offender Laws and the Jurisprudence of Authoritarian Social Control, 37 U. TOL. L. REV. 705, 705, 728 (2006).
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these was California’s 1994 “Three Strikes” law, which enacted increased penalties for people with a felony conviction. 219 If a defendant had one prior felony conviction and was convicted of a second felony, the defendant’s
maximum sentence doubled. 220 If the defendant was convicted of a third felony, the law mandated a state prison term of at least twenty-five years to life. 221
Other states around the country followed suit. 222 This period also saw the
adoption of laws establishing mandatory minimum sentences for certain violent offenses. 223 In addition, the victim’s rights movement gained traction,
leading to the passage of laws requiring victims to be included in the disposition of cases. 224 Victims were now able to appear in court and on the record at
sentencings. 225 The crack cocaine epidemic ushered in aggressive street-level
policing. 226 States also passed a range of severe collateral consequences, like
lifetime disenfranchisement for those convicted of a felony. 227
Over the last sixty years, a range of factors have contributed to “an experiment in punitive criminal justice the likes of which the world ha[s] never
seen.” 228 One contributor is status-regime modernization, in which the War
on Drugs and its attendant racial profiling, over policing of communities of
color, and discriminatory mandatory minimums for possession of drugs more
likely to be found in poor, Black neighborhoods, evolved into a stunningly
effective form of systemic racism. 229 Another is the expansion of prosecutorial
power, resulting from decades of rising crime rates, politicians who wanted to
be seen as “tough on crime,” and a strong, pro-prison lobby enabling prosecutors to win more convictions. 230 A third factor is the unforeseen consequences that flowed from communities of color, vulnerable from years of
219. See id. at 728 n.107.
220. Anusua Datta, California’s Three Strikes Law Revisited: Assessing the Long-Term Effects of the Law, 45 ATL. ECON. J. 225, 226 (2017).
221. Id. The three-strikes law was amended in 2012 by Proposition 36. Charles Zone Tsuei,
A Substantial Relationship to Justify Use of Prior Adjudications as a “Strike”: Reforming Penal Code
Section 667 Subsection (d)(3) & Section 1170.12 Subsection (b)(3), 43 W. ST. L. REV. 41, 48 (2015).
222. White, supra note 218, at 705.
223. See James Cullen, Sentencing Laws and How They Contribute to Mass Incarceration,
BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (Oct. 5, 2018), https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/analysisopinion/sentencing-laws-and-how-they-contribute-mass-incarceration
[perma.cc/BGB5AZ3R].
224. See Jill Lepore, The Rise of the Victims’-Rights Movement, NEW YORKER (May 14,
2018), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2018/05/21/the-rise-of-the-victims-rights-movement [perma.cc/74S7-AD7S].
225. See id.
226. FORMAN, supra note 138, at 156.
227. Id. at 7.
228. Id. at 6–7.
229. See, e.g., MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE
AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS 110, 122–23 (10th anniversary ed. 2020).
230. See generally JOHN F. PFAFF, LOCKED IN: THE TRUE CAUSES OF MASS INCARCERATION—
AND HOW TO ACHIEVE REAL REFORM (2017) (discussing these factors in the context of the incarceration story).
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underenforcement, desperately trying to keep their communities safe during
the crack epidemic of the 1980s and 1990s. 231
Whatever its contributing factors, mass incarceration evolved over a
forty-year period as the “result of small, distinct steps, each of whose significance becomes more apparent over time, and only when considered in light
of later events.” 232 All these steps would conspire to ensure that the United
States remains “the world’s largest jailer.” 233
3.

Hyperincarceration 234

The result is that even though today’s incarceration rate is hovering at its
lowest level in twenty years, 235 the United States still has the largest prison
population in the world. 236 On any given day, the United States has more than
2.1 million people in prison. 237 That number represents an almost 500 percent
increase over the last forty years 238 and an incarceration rate of 655 inmates

231. See FORMAN, supra note 138, at 35, 156–57.
232. Id. at 45; see Arit John, A Timeline of the Rise and Fall of ‘Tough on Crime’ Drug Sentencing, ATLANTIC (Apr. 22, 2014), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2014/04/a-timeline-of-the-rise-and-fall-of-tough-on-crime-drug-sentencing/360983 [perma.cc/RZ8H-FTCB].
233. FORMAN, supra note 138, at 18.
234. While this overreliance on incarceration is popularly referred to as “mass incarceration,” many scholars instead choose to call it “hyperincarceration,” to reflect the fact that the
increased incarceration has largely been concentrated in communities of color. See, e.g., Loïc
Wacquant, Deadly Symbiosis: When Ghetto and Prison Meet and Mesh, in MASS IMPRISONMENT:
SOCIAL CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES, supra note 199, at 82; see also Loïc Wacquant, Class, Race
& Hyperincarceration in Revanchist America, DAEDALUS, Summer 2010, at 74, 74 (“[T]he stupendous expansion and intensification of the activities of the American police, criminal courts,
and prison over the past thirty years have been finely targeted, first by class, second by race, and
third by place, leading not to mass incarceration but to the hyperincarceration of (sub)proletarian African American men from the imploding ghetto.”).
235. John Gramlich, America’s Incarceration Rate Is at a Two-Decade Low, PEW RSCH.
CTR. (May 2, 2018), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/05/02/americas-incarceration
-rate-is-at-a-two-decade-low [perma.cc/C3Z4-84E5].
236. ROY WALMSLEY, INST. FOR CRIM. POL’Y RSCH., WORLD PRISON POPULATION LIST 2
(12th ed. 2018), https://www.prisonstudies.org/sites/default/files/resources/downloads/wppl_
12.pdf [perma.cc/283L-D2TR]. According to the World Prison Population List, China, with
18.91 percent of the world’s population, has the next largest prison population, with 1.65 million
people. Id. China is followed by Brazil (690,000), Russia (583,000), India (420,000), and Thailand
(364,000). Id. Fifty-three percent, or more than half, of all countries and territories for which
data were available have incarceration rates below 150 prisoners per 100,000 people, making the
world prison population rate 145 per 100,000. Id. The United States’ incarceration rate is 4.5
times the world incarceration rate. Id.
237. Id. The World Prison Population List indicates that 655 of every 100,000 Americans
are in prison. Id. The countries with the next highest rates of incarceration per 100,000 people
are El Salvador (604), Turkmenistan (552), the U.S. Virgin Islands (542), Thailand (526), Cuba
(510), and the Maldives (499). Id.
238. THE SENT’G PROJECT, FACT SHEET: TRENDS IN U.S. CORRECTIONS 2 (2020),
https://www.sentencingproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/Trends-in-US-Corrections.pdf
[perma.cc/2DUU-KRVX].
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per 100,000 Americans. Despite having only 4.39 percent of the world’s population, the United States has 19.75 percent of the world’s incarcerated population. 239 The United States currently spends $80.7 billion each year on
prisons, jails, parole, and probation. 240
Black and Latino communities overwhelmingly bear the disproportionate
brunt of the costs of overincarceration. According to Bureau of Justice Statistics data, in 2017, the last year for which information is available, the rate of
imprisonment of Black adults was 1,549 per 100,000, the rate of imprisonment
for Hispanic adults was 823 per 100,000, and the rate of imprisonment of
white adults was 272 per 100,000. 241 The imprisonment rate for Black men
who were convicted and sentenced (2,336 per 100,000 Black men) was almost
six times that of white men who were convicted and sentenced (397 per
100,000 white men). 242 The imprisonment rate for Black women (92 per
100,000 Black women) was almost double that for white women (49 per
100,000 white women). 243 Vestiges of the renounced superpredator predictions linger: young Black men between the ages of eighteen and nineteen were
a whopping twelve times more likely to be imprisoned than young white men
of the same age. 244 And the disparity was not exclusive to youth. Black men
ages sixty-five or older were 4.5 times more likely to be imprisoned than white
men of the same age. 245
II.

RACE AS A FACTOR IN RACE-CONSCIOUS ADMISSIONS AND IN
DISPROPORTIONATE MINORITY CONTACT

So excavated, the intertwining histories and evolutions of affirmative action and disproportionate minority contact provide a necessary context for
the way the jurisprudence has developed for each. But the cases offer no assistance at all in illuminating this nexus. To the contrary, the Supreme Court’s
sanitized jurisprudence concerning affirmative action in both higher education and in the criminal legal system “ha[ve] conspired to turn our attention

WALMSLEY, supra note 236, at 2.
Peter Wagner & Bernadette Rabuy, Following the Money of Mass Incarceration,
PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE (Jan. 25, 2017), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/money.html
[perma.cc/QDA9-JFDT].
241. JENNIFER BRONSON & E. ANN CARSON, BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST.,
PRISONERS IN 2017, at 9 tbl.5 (2019), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/p17.pdf [perma.cc
/U2UE-7D9P]. The World Prison Population List’s data for United States prisoners, cited above,
is different from the data collected by the Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS). For example, the BJS
counts the number of inmates per 100,000 adults ages 18 and older, while the World Prison
Population Lisa measures each country’s incarceration rate as the number of inmates per
100,000 people of any age. The World Prison Brief also counts jail inmates differently from the
way BJS counts them. See id. at 1; see also WALMSLEY, supra note 236, at 1.
242. BRONSON & CARSON, supra note 241, at 1.
243. Id. at 15.
244. Id.
245. Id.
239.
240.
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away from our history” and “erode our shared understanding.” 246 But a historic reasoning cannot quiet the echoes of centuries of stereotypes that present
themselves in so many protean guises. Failing to meaningfully engage with the
country’s racial history, the Court’s jurisprudence seems to “assume the existence of the very colorblind society that we have yet to achieve.” 247
In race-conscious admissions jurisprudence, this omission has taken the
form of casting the country’s racial history as a shameful but fortunately static
period in our history that has been largely addressed and overcome. 248 “From
this perspective, antidiscrimination law appears as a portal through which
contemporary Americans stepped through to a brand new present, a world
free of the structural iniquities forged during the era of American apartheid.” 249
A. Race as a Factor in Admissions
At least according to opponents of race-conscious admissions programs,
such measures have an expiration date. The Supreme Court has issued five 250
major decisions concerning the use of race-conscious admissions policies in
higher education: Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 251 decided
in 1978; Grutter v. Bollinger 252 and Gratz v. Bollinger, 253 decided on the same day
in 2003; and two additional cases, both captioned Fisher v. University of Texas
at Austin. The first, decided in 2013, is commonly referred to as Fisher I, 254
and the second, decided in 2016, is commonly known as Fisher II. 255
In a dictum that opponents of race-conscious admissions cite as a time
limit on the employment of such policies, Justice O’Connor wrote, “[The

246. Lee C. Bollinger, Commentary, What Once Was Lost Must Now Be Found: Rediscovering an Affirmative Action Jurisprudence Informed by the Reality of Race in America, 129 HARV.
L. REV. F. 281, 282 (2016).
247. Id.
248. Kimberlé W. Crenshaw, “Framing Affirmative Action,” 105 MICH. L. REV. FIRST
IMPRESSIONS 123, 128 (2007).
249. Id. In a previous article, I have discussed how the Court’s failure to consider the realities of how Black children were treated by the juvenile justice system led to the Court’s establishing a right to counsel in juvenile court that falls short when it comes to protecting youth’s
rights. Robin Walker Sterling, Fundamental Unfairness: In re Gault and the Road Not Taken, 72
MD. L. REV. 607 (2013).
250. The first challenge to affirmative action since it was established in the 1960s was DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974). In that case, the Court considered a challenge to the
admissions policies of the University of Washington School of Law by Marco DeFunis, Jr., a
white man who argued that he was rejected by the law school because the school admitted lessqualified minority applicants. Id. at 314. He sued and was admitted. Id. at 314–15. By the time
the Court took up his case, he was in his last year of law school. Id. at 315. The Court ruled that
the case was moot, without addressing the merits. Id. at 319–20.
251. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
252. 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
253. 539 U.S. 244 (2003).
254. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin (Fisher I), 570 U.S. 297 (2013).
255. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin (Fisher II), 136 S. Ct. 2198 (2016).
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Court] expect[s] that 25 years from now, the use of racial preferences will no
longer be necessary to further the interest approved today.” 256 Justice O’Connor wrote that in 2003. 257 As 2028 draws closer, calls to “take race out of” admissions in higher education persist. 258 Abigail Fisher, the plaintiff in Fisher I
and Fisher II, said she hoped that the Supreme Court would “take race out of
the issue in terms of admissions and that everyone will be able to get into any
school that they want no matter what race they are but solely based on their
merit and if they work hard for it.” 259 Cheryl Hopwood, the plaintiff in a case
that reached the Fifth Circuit, said “[r]ace should just not be a determining
factor in admissions policy at the level of law school.” 260 And Kathleen Brose,
plaintiff in a school testing race-conscious admissions in K-12 education, said
that people need to “move beyond race.” 261
1.

The Relegation of the Remedial Rationale

Tracking how the Court discusses the consideration of race in admissions
in each of these cases reveals a dissonant, optimistic refrain about the state of
race relations, even as the Court jettisoned the historical context of school segregation and relied on false equivalency to lament the unfairness of having
race discrimination in dual roles as both disease and cure. Through these
cases, the Court has considered different race-conscious admissions policies,
as well as different rationales to defend schools’ reliance on such policies. To
date, the Court has rejected the use of quotas, or earmarking a specific number
of spots for people of color; rejected the remedial rationale, which defends
race-conscious admissions policies as measures intended to address past and
ongoing racial oppression; and endorsed the diversity rationale, which defends race-conscious admissions policies as measures intended to increase diversity in institutions of higher learning. 262

256. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 343.
257. Id.
258. Adam Liptak, Race and College Admissions, Facing a New Test by Justices, N.Y. TIMES
(Oct. 8, 2012), https://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/09/us/supreme-court-to-hear-case-on-affirmative-action.html [perma.cc/AQ7B-73X6].
259. Id.
260. Richard Bernstein, Racial Discrimination or Righting Past Wrongs?, N.Y. TIMES (July
13, 1994), https://www.nytimes.com/1994/07/13/us/racial-discrimination-or-righting-pastwrongs.html [perma.cc/Z65R-LNMS]; Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 533 U.S. 929, 929 (2001).
261. Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 718 (2007);
Mike Lewis, Q&A: Woman Who Fought School District, SEATTLE PI (Mar. 21, 2011, 3:21 PM),
http://www.seattlepi.com/local/article/Q-AWoman-who-fought-school-district-1242209.php
[perma.cc/UG4F-J54X].
262. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978); Grutter, 539 U.S. 306;
Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003); Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin (Fisher I), 570 U.S. 297
(2013); Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin (Fisher II), 136 S. Ct. 2198 (2016).
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Early cases addressing affirmative action in employment spoke explicitly
about redressing the legacy of past discrimination. 263 One court struck down
a seniority program on the grounds that “Congress did not intend to freeze an
entire generation of Negro employees into discriminatory patterns.” 264 Another court interpreted the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as “provid[ing] a remedy
for a long-continued denial of vital rights of minorities and of every American.” 265 Another court described affirmative action measures as “a method of
presently eliminating the effects of past racial discriminatory practices
and . . . making meaningful in the immediate future the constitutional guarantees against racial discrimination.” 266 In its statement on affirmative action,
the United States Commission on Civil Rights described that the goal of affirmative action is to “correct or compensate for past or present discrimination or to prevent discrimination from recurring in the future.” 267
One year later, in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, the
Court had the chance to endorse the remedial rationale as a constitutionally
sound motivation for race-conscious admissions policies. 268 In Bakke, the
Court considered the admissions policy of the University of California, Davis,
School of Medicine, which set aside sixteen of the one hundred seats in its
first-year class for disadvantaged and minority students. 269 Bakke challenged
the admissions policy on Title VI and Fourteenth Amendment grounds. 270 UC
Davis’s quota system was ultimately ruled unconstitutional because it allowed
minority applicants to be considered for every one of the one hundred possible seats in the first-year class, while limiting white applicants to only eightyfour of the one hundred possible spots. 271 But the Bakke Court was fractured.
Six separate opinions were filed. 272 Four justices, Justice Stevens, Chief Justice
Burger, Justice Rehnquist and Justice Stewart, agreed with Bakke that the university’s affirmative action policy violated Title VI because it amounted to a
quota. 273 And four other justices, Justices Blackmun, Brennan, White, and
Marshall, argued that the college’s quota system was permissible under both
Title VI and the Fourteenth Amendment. 274 Justices White, Marshall, and

263. See, e.g., United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 204–07 (1979).
264. Quarles v. Philip Morris, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 505, 516 (E.D. Va. 1968).
265. Weiner v. Cuyahoga Cmty. Coll. Dist., 238 N.E.2d 839, 844 (Ohio Ct. C.P. Cuyahoga
Cnty. 1968).
266. Carter v. Gallagher, 452 F.2d 315, 331 (8th Cir. 1971) (en banc).
267. U.S. COMM’N ON C.R., STATEMENT ON AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 2 (1977).
268. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
269. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 274–75, 279 (1978) (detailing the school’s “special admissions” program for disadvantaged or minority applicants).
270. Id. at 270.
271. Id. at 289–90 (opinion of Powell, J.).
272. Id. at 267–68.
273. Id. at 408 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
274. Id. at 324 (Brennan, White, Marshall & Blackmun, JJ., concurring in the judgment in
part and dissenting in part).
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Blackmun all filed separate opinions. 275 Justice Powell announced the judgment of the Court. 276
Justice Powell agreed with the four justices who voted to strike down the
quota system but wrote on his own to endorse the notions that race can be
taken into account in university admissions and that diversity is a constitutionally defensible rationale on which to base use of race-conscious admissions policies. 277 “[T]he attainment of a diverse student body,” Justice Powell
wrote, “clearly is a constitutionally permissible goal for an institution of higher
education.” 278 Justice Powell cast the pursuit of a diverse student population
as a kind of academic freedom, observing that “universities must be accorded
the right to select those students who will contribute the most to the ‘robust
exchange of ideas.’ ” 279 Justice Powell’s opinion described a vibrant campus
that, in addition to racial diversity, contained many other kinds of diversity,
like “exceptional personal talents, unique work or service experience, leadership potential, maturity, demonstrated compassion, [and] a history of overcoming disadvantage.” 280
The remaining four justices explicitly endorsed the remedial rationale. 281
The justices wrote that the Equal Protection Clause means that “[g]overnment
may take race into account when it acts not to demean or insult any racial
group, but to remedy disadvantages cast on minorities by past racial prejudice,
at least when appropriate findings have been made by judicial, legislative, or
administrative bodies with competence to act in this area.” 282 The opinion
started its narrative with chattel slavery as the “antithesis” of the principle that
“all Men are created equal.” 283 The opinion discussed the exegesis of the Fourteenth Amendment as it was first enacted to protect the newly freed Black
people, then as it was contorted to justify the “separate but equal” doctrine
275. Id. at 379 (White, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part); id. at
387 (Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part); id. at 402
(Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
276. Id. at 269 (opinion of Powell, J.).
277. Id. at 311–17.
278. Id. at 311–12. Justice Powell continued: “Academic freedom . . . long has been viewed as
a special concern of the First Amendment. The freedom of a university to make its own judgments
as to education includes the selection of its student body.” Id. Some federal appellate courts considered Justice Powell’s opinion controlling and found that diversity was a compelling state interest.
See, e.g., Smith v. Univ. of Wash. L. Sch., 233 F.3d 1188, 1199–200 (9th Cir. 2000). Other federal
appellate courts did not consider Justice Powell’s opinion to be controlling. See, e.g., Hopwood v.
Texas, 236 F.3d 256, 275 n.66 (5th Cir. 2000) (“[W]e read Bakke as not foreclosing (but certainly
not requiring) the acceptance by lower courts of diversity as a compelling state interest.”).
279. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 313 (opinion of Powell, J.).
280. Id. at 317. As an example, Justice Powell held up the Harvard College admissions program, which folded race into the admissions calculus as a “plus factor,” allowing all applicants
to compete for all available seats. Id. at 316–17.
281. Id. at 325, 340–45 (Brennan, White, Marshall & Blackmun, JJ., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
282. Id. at 325.
283. Id. at 326.
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that formed the legal basis for American apartheid, and finally as it reemerged
in Brown v. Board of Education to strike down that same doctrine. 284 The justices were clear that the lingering effects of segregation, only recently prohibited,
were still very real. 285 “[W]e cannot,” they wrote, “let color blindness become
myopia which masks the reality that many ‘created equal’ have been treated
within our lifetimes as inferior both by the law and by their fellow citizens.” 286
Justice Blackmun was of the unambiguous view that “[i]n order to get beyond racism, we must first take account of race. There is no other way.” 287 He
added, “[I]n order to treat some persons equally, we must treat them differently. We cannot—we dare not—let the Equal Protection Clause perpetuate
racial supremacy.” 288
Nonetheless, with Justice Powell providing the fifth vote to strike down
the policy, the diversity rationale seemed to have won the day. 289 Because of
the significant differences between the remedial and diversity rationales, this
choice by the Court represented a critical missed opportunity. First, of course,
the rationales’ different goals mean different routes to successfully achieving
those goals. The remedial rationale set a goal of addressing past inequitable
treatment based on race, while the diversity rationale set a goal of enriching a
given institution or community. The diversity rationale requires only that
Black people be present at a particular institution, and so an affirmative action
program under the diversity rationale is considered successful if it can be
shown to have increased the number of Black people at a school, for example.
The remedial rationale, on the other hand, “aim[ed] to correct for past injustice, and so a successful remedial program must actually improve the situation of nonwhite individuals.” 290 Such improvement would require
“meaningful institutional efforts at inclusion that make such progress possible.” 291 Like the proximity that the Court seemed to encourage in Brown v.
Board of Education, the remedial rationale, by connecting present practices to
past injustices, had far more potential than the diversity rationale to effect
meaningful improvement in race relations. Urging a constant remembrance
of our past, the remedial rationale would not allow us to “let the Equal Protection Clause perpetuate racial supremacy.” 292

284. Id. at 326–27.
285. Id. at 327.
286. Id.
287. Id. at 407 (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
288. Id.
289. See id. at 271 (opinion of Powell, J.).
290. Nancy Leong, Racial Capitalism, 126 HARV. L. REV. 2151, 2170 (2013).
291. Id.
292. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 407 (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
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The Diversity Rationale Prevails

The question of whether diversity was a compelling state interest that
could justify the narrowly tailored use of race in admitting students to public
universities would be settled twenty-five years later, in Grutter v. Bollinger. 293
Barbara Grutter applied to the University of Michigan Law School in April
1996, four years after the school had adopted a new admissions policy that
explicitly incorporated a commitment to diversity, in the form of “the inclusion of students from groups which have been historically discriminated
against, like African-Americans, Hispanics and Native Americans, who without this commitment might not be represented in [the] student body in meaningful numbers.” 294 The policy aimed to admit a “critical mass” of historically
underrepresented populations and anticipated an individualized, holistic review of each applicant’s candidacy. 295 The policy also relied on the typically
accepted predictors of student success, the student’s LSAT score and undergraduate GPA. 296 Grutter, a working mother with a 3.81 GPA and LSAT scores
in the eighty-sixth percentile, 297 sued, stating “I think that I was discriminated
against in the admission process, very specifically, because I believe they have
different criteria based on race.” 298
The Grutter Court upheld Michigan Law School’s admissions policy. 299
Adopting Justice Powell’s defense of diversity as a form of academic freedom,
the Grutter majority explicitly endorsed diversity as a state interest compelling
enough to survive strict scrutiny. 300 The Court further found that seeking a
“critical mass” of diverse students was a permissible goal, not an unconstitutional quota. 301 It also concluded that the law school’s admissions policy was
narrowly tailored, largely because the policy incorporated an individualized,
comprehensive review of each applicant that included consideration of both
racial and nonracial attributes. 302 In other words, race was permissible as one
of many factors schools might fold into their admissions decisions. And, of
course, the Court looked forward to the day, twenty-five years in the future,
when programs like Michigan’s would no longer be necessary. 303

293.
294.
295.

Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 343–44 (2003).
Id. at 314, 316.
Id.; Wendy Parker, The Story of Grutter v. Bollinger: Affirmative Action Wins, in
EDUCATION LAW STORIES 83, 87 (Michael A. Olivas & Ronna Greff Schneider eds., 2008).
296. Parker, supra note 295, at 86.
297. Id. at 83.
298. Elizabeth Brackett, Admitting Diversity: University of Michigan’s Law School, PBS
NEWSHOUR (Aug. 21, 2001, 12:00 AM), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/show/admitting-diversity-university-of-michigans-law-school [perma.cc/Z8UR-VAPB].
299. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 343–44.
300. Id. at 325.
301. Id. at 330.
302. Id. at 341.
303. Id. at 343.
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Nine years later, in 2012, Abigail Fisher challenged the admissions policy
at the University of Texas. 304 In Fisher I, the Court considered the constitutionality of the university’s undergraduate admissions policy, which took a
hybrid approach to creating a diverse college community, combining a percentage plan and an individualized, holistic review plan. 305 In response to earlier litigation in the Fifth Circuit, in 1996 the university adopted the Ten
Percent Plan, which offered automatic acceptance to any state university to
any student from Texas who graduated within the top ten percent of her, his,
or their high school class. 306 This plan, which accounted for over 75 percent
of the admitted students, 307 helped to ensure a diverse community because
Texas public schools, like the public schools in states all across the country,
reflected the segregated reality of the neighborhoods they served. 308 The Top
Ten Percent Plan relied on the cynicism of post-Brown resegregation to engineer a diverse college community.
All students not admitted pursuant to the Top Ten Percent Plan were admitted through a process that, by the time Fisher applied in 2008, prioritized
individualized review and allowed for consideration of many factors, including the applicant’s race. 309 Fisher, not in the top 10 percent of her class, applied
to UT with a 3.59 GPA and a score of 1180 on the SAT and was denied admission. 310 Fisher sued UT because its admissions scheme included consideration
of the applicant’s race as part of the school’s holistic assessment of the student’s candidacy. 311 In arguing against the school’s inclusion of race as a factor, she took the position that UT’s earlier admissions policies had created
such “substantial and growing levels of Hispanic and African-American enrollment” that a race-conscious admissions policy was no longer needed. 312
Fisher I left Grutter’s endorsement of the diversity rationale intact. 313 Instead of jettisoning the diversity rationale, the Court took the case as an opportunity to address a procedural question, underscoring that courts should

304. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin (Fisher I), 570 U.S. 297, 300–03 (2013).
305. Id. at 304–05.
306. Id. (citing Texas v. Hopwood, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996)).
307. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin (Fisher II), 136 S. Ct. 2198, 2206 (2016).
308. See Fisher I, 570 U.S. at 305.
309. Id. at 304–06. These factors included attributes like work experience, leadership, extracurricular activities, community service, awards, and other unique circumstances that indicate the student’s potential to make a meaningful contribution to the UT campus community.
Id. at 304. Additionally, in its brief, the university explained that race is “a factor of a factor of a
factor of a factor” in this individualized review. Brief for Respondents at 13, Fisher I, 570 U.S.
297 (No. 11-345). UT also explained that it does not assign any “automatic advantage or value”
to race or any other factor. Id. at 14. Instead, in accordance with Grutter, “[e]ach applicant is
considered as a whole person,” with race considered as one of many factors. Id.
310. Brief for Respondents, supra note 309, at 15.
311. Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. at 2207.
312. Brief for Petitioner at 35, Fisher I, 570 U.S. 297 (No. 11-345).
313. See Fisher I, 570 U.S. at 311–12.
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review universities’ race-conscious admissions plans de novo. 314 The Court
remanded to the Fifth Circuit. 315 The Fifth Circuit upheld the UT admissions
policy’s inclusion of race as part of a comprehensive review as necessary to
create the diverse community that would support its educational mission. 316
Fisher appealed again. 317 In Fisher II, the Court again upheld UT’s admissions
scheme, holding that its race-conscious admissions policy survived the
Court’s strict scrutiny inquiry. 318 The university clearly defined the state’s
compelling interest in ensuring a diverse college community, listing some of
the benefits as preparing students for diverse workplaces, countering stereotypes, increasing cross-racial understanding and communication, burnishing
the school’s legitimacy in creating leaders and contributing community members, encouraging the rigorous exchange of ideas, and fostering cross-cultural
learning and experiences. 319
3.

The Effects of Elevating the Diversity Rationale

The effects of elevating the diversity rationale continue to shape current
equal protection jurisprudence. There are two competing ways of understanding the constitutional guarantee of equal protection: as announcing an antisubordination principle, on the one hand, or imposing merely an
anticlassification principle on the other. 320 Antisubordination holds that “it is
wrong for the state to engage in practices that enforce the inferior social status
of historically oppressed groups.” 321 Anticlassification, however, prioritizes a
“commitment to protect individuals against all forms of racial classification,
including ‘benign’ or ‘reverse’ discrimination.” 322 For those who subscribe to
the anticlassification concept, there is little tension between opposing affirmative action and accepting disproportionate minority representation in the
criminal legal system. As to both institutions, the anticlassification view would
say that the government must simply forego the explicit use of racial classifications and its equal protection obligations will be satisfied. The anticlassification view rarely concerns itself with the results of a facially neutral system,

314. See id. at 312–14.
315. Id. at 315.
316. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 758 F.3d 633, 660 (5th Cir. 2014).
317. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin (Fisher II), 136 S. Ct. 2198, 2207 (2016).
318. See id. at 2210–14.
319. Id. at 2210–11.
320. See Reva B. Siegel, Equality Talk: Antisubordination and Anticlassification Values in
Constitutional Struggles Over Brown, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1470, 1472–73 (2004) [hereinafter
Equality Talk]; Darren Lenard Hutchinson, “Unexplainable on Grounds Other Than Race”: The
Inversion of Privilege and Subordination in Equal Protection Jurisprudence, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV.
615, 672; Darren Lenard Hutchinson, Comment, Factless Jurisprudence, 34 COLUM. HUM. RTS.
L. REV. 615, 625 (2003); Reva Siegel, Why Equal Protection No Longer Protects: The Evolving
Forms of Status-Enforcing State Action, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1111, 1136 (1997).
321. Equality Talk, supra note 320, at 1472–73.
322. Id. at 1473.
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no matter how racially stratified. In other words, government decisionmaking
can produce a grossly disparate set of results and still be perfectly constitutional. While scholars have offered valuable critiques that expose the evasions,
biases, and other flaws of the anticlassification view, for the time being the idea
that government decisionmaking can legally perpetuate racially disparate results unfortunately remains a précis of current doctrine. 323
B. Race as a Factor in Disproportionate Minority Contact
Far from setting a deadline for the end of racial disparities in the criminal
legal system, the Court has pronounced such bias to be “inevitable.” 324 In a
1987 challenge to administration of the death penalty in Georgia, the Court
held that racial bias in capital sentencing, proved through rigorous statistical
evidence, is not constitutionally significant absent clear evidence of a specific,
racially discriminatory intent. 325
Warren McCleskey was an African American man who had been sentenced to death for killing a white police officer during an armed robbery. 326
McCleskey argued that his death sentence contravened the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments because it was tainted by racial bias. 327 To support his
claim, he offered a comprehensive study of over two thousand murder cases
in Georgia. 328 The study revealed that Black lives mattered less than white
lives: defendants charged with killing white victims were eleven times more
likely to be sentenced to death than defendants charged with killing Black victims. 329 The Court answered McCleskey’s argument with the observation that
“[a]pparent disparities in sentencing,” including “a discrepancy that appears
to correlate with race,” are an “inevitable part of our criminal justice system.” 330 The majority knew that its opinion in this case could have far-reaching consequences:
[T]aken to its logical conclusion, [the defendant’s claim] throws into serious
question the principles that underlie our entire criminal justice system. . . . [I]f we accepted McCleskey’s claim that racial bias has impermissibly tainted the capital sentencing decision, we could soon be faced with
similar claims as to other types of penalty. 331

323. See id. at 1472–73.
324. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 312 (1987).
325. Id. at 298.
326. Id. at 283. In 2017, Northwestern Law School held a symposium examining the
McCleskey decision. See Symposium, “A Fear of Too Much Justice”?: Equal Protection and the
Social Sciences Thirty Years After McCleskey v. Kemp, 112 NW. U. L. REV. 1259 (2018).
327. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 286.
328. Id.
329. See id. at 286–87.
330. Id. at 312.
331. Id. at 314–15.
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The Court did not just decline Warren McCleskey’s invitation to set a deadline for the end of invidious race bias in the criminal legal system; it went so far
as to reject his argument, even as it accepted the validity of the study’s findings. 332
Responding to the majority’s expressed concern that granting relief in this
case would open the floodgates to similar relief in other categories of crimes,
Justice Brennan’s dissent observed that it was as though the majority had a
“fear of too much justice.” 333 Considered by some to be the “Dred Scott decision of our time,” 334 the McCleskey decision seemed to “condone[] the expression of racism,” not racial preferences meant to correct past injustice, but
racism meant to perpetuate past injustice, “in a profound aspect of our law.” 335
The Court has decided dozens of cases that concern the intersection of
race and criminal justice. Here, I will highlight three that specifically address
the consideration of race at three different discretionary points in the criminal
justice process. These cases, Whren v. United States, United States v. Armstrong, and Batson v. Kentucky, have an important through line: reification of
McCleskey’s grim pronouncement with reliance on pretext that glamours the
reality of the criminal legal system’s demographics, how those demographics
are achieved, and the message that those demographics send.
In Whren, the Court held that pretextual traffic stops are constitutional. 336
A pretextual traffic stop is one that is prompted by suspicion first and traffic
violations second. 337 For example, police officers can tail a motorist who they
suspect is traveling with contraband and pull the motorist over once she commits a traffic violation. 338 Once an officer has stopped a car, the officer is able
to search for contraband even if there has not been any indication that there
is contraband in the car. 339
This was the situation Michael Whren and James Brown, two African
American men, found themselves in Washington, D.C., in June 1993. At their
suppression hearing before their criminal trial on drug charges, a vice-squad
police officer testified that his squad saw Brown and Whren in a dark Pathfinder truck with temporary license plates while the squad was patrolling a
“high-drug area.” 340 The officer testified that Brown and Whren drew the
332. See id. at 312–20.
333. Id. at 339 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
334. Adam Liptak, New Look at Death Sentences and Race, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 29, 2008),
https://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/29/us/29bar.html [perma.cc/GVX9-QAGJ].
335. Anthony Lewis, Opinion, Bowing to Racism, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 28, 1987), https://www
.nytimes.com/1987/04/28/opinion/abroad-at-home-bowing-to-racism.html [perma.cc/K9GXNW2A].
336. See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 808, 813, 817–19 (1996) (holding that the
failure to put on a turn signal was a sufficient basis for a police stop).
337. Id. at 808–09.
338. Id.
339. See Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 301 (1999) (“[When] probable cause justifies
the search of a lawfully stopped vehicle, it justifies the search of every part of the vehicle and its
contents . . . .” (emphasis added by court) (quoting United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 825 (1982))).
340. United States v. Whren, 53 F.3d 371, 372 (D.C. Cir. 1995); Whren, 517 U.S. at 808.

496

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 120:451

squad’s attention because the two “youthful occupants” were stopped for an
unusually long time at a stop sign and seemed to be looking at something in
Whren’s lap. 341 When the officers made a U-turn in the truck’s direction, the
Pathfinder sped off at an “unreasonable” speed. 342 The officer testified that the
police pulled up alongside to give the driver “a warning concerning traffic violations.” 343 Once the officers pulled the truck over and asked Brown to put
the car in park, one of them subsequently saw two large plastic bags of what
looked like cocaine in Whren’s hands. 344
The Court rejected Whren’s proposed Fourth Amendment test for traffic
stops: “[W]hether a police officer, acting reasonably, would have made the
stop for the reason given.” 345 Because driving is so heavily regulated, Whren
argued, allowing police to make stops based on any traffic violation would enable officers motivated by invidious discrimination to hide their intent behind
bogus traffic infractions. 346 Whren’s proposed test sought to undermine potential race-based motivation for effecting a traffic stop. Although Whren’s
proposed test could be addressed with objective evidence (How many traffic
stops for this infraction have there been in the last year? Where did those stops
happen in relation to the stop at issue?), the Court took Whren’s proposal as
an invitation to fold a police officer’s subjective motivation into the Fourth
Amendment analysis. The Court instead held that the “constitutional reasonableness of traffic stops” does not “depend[] on the actual motivations of the
individual officers involved.” 347
Another example of the Court’s shielding of racially tinged discretion in
the criminal legal system is its holding in Armstrong that defendants who suspect racial bias in prosecutorial decisions must first proffer enough evidence
to make out their claim before they will be entitled to discovery from the government. 348 Christopher Lee Armstrong was arrested on federal drug charges
after a sting operation by a joint federal–state task force. 349 Armstrong’s federal
public defenders realized that every defendant facing crack cocaine–related
offenses represented by their office during the past year was Black or Latino. 350
This disparity was all the more suspicious because most crack offenders are

341. Whren, 53 F.3d at 372; Whren, 517 U.S. at 808.
342. Whren, 517 U.S. at 808.
343. Id. at 809–10 (citing D.C. Mun. Regs. tit. 18, § 2213.4 (1995) (“An operator
shall . . . give full time and attention to the operation of the vehicle.”); then citing id. § 2204.3
(“No person shall turn any vehicle . . . without giving an appropriate signal.”); and then citing
id. § 2200.3 (“No person shall drive a vehicle . . . at a speed greater than is reasonable and prudent
under the conditions.”)).
344. Id. at 808–09.
345. Id. at 810.
346. Id.
347. Id. at 813.
348. United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 463, 465 (1996).
349. Id. at 458–59.
350. Id. at 459.
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white. 351 The public defenders hypothesized that the prosecutors were diverting white defendants to California’s state courts, where the penalties for crack
cocaine possession and distribution are far more lenient. 352 Armstrong’s federal public defenders filed a motion for discovery of the prosecutors’ files detailing their decisions concerning whom to prosecute and in what forum. 353
The prosecutors refused to comply and appealed the defense’s discovery request to the Supreme Court. 354
The Armstrong Court held that because Armstrong could not point to any
similarly situated white defendants who should have been charged in federal
court but were not, he was not entitled to discovery on his selective prosecution claim. 355 But of course the only way Armstrong would know of any similarly situated white defendants would be from discovery. The Court required
Armstrong to produce the very evidence Armstrong was trying to acquire. The
result is that prosecutors’ charging decisions are essentially unassailable. 356
Finally, the Court has upheld reliance on pretextual reasons to defend
peremptory strikes based on invidious race discrimination in jury selection.
In Batson v. Kentucky, the Court held that a prosecutor cannot exclude a potential juror because of their race, and it crafted a three-step process by which
a defense attorney might mount a challenge to such discriminatory behavior
during jury selection. 357 First, defense counsel must establish that the prosecutor’s behavior during voir dire, including the prosecutor’s questions, questioning patterns, and deployment of strikes, raise an inference, or a “prima
facie” case, of race discrimination. 358 Then, the burden shifts to the prosecutor
to defend the government’s actions by offering race-neutral explanations for

351. Id. at 479–80 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
352. ALEXANDER, supra note 229, at 145.
353. See Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 459.
354. Id. at 459–61.
355. Id. at 470.
356. In 2014, the University of Chicago Law School’s Federal Criminal Justice Clinic filed
a racial-discrimination challenge on behalf of forty-three indigent criminal defendants alleging that
the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF) unconstitutionally discriminated
on the basis of race in targeting people of color for its stash-house sting operations. Shayna Jacobs, 10 Years. 179 Arrests. No White Defendants. DEA Tactics Face Scrutiny in New York., WASH.
POST (Dec. 14, 2019, 8:05 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/10-years179-arrests-no-white-defendants-dea-tactics-face-scrutiny-in-new-york/2019/12/14/f646224212ce-11ea-bf62-eadd5d11f559_story.html [perma.cc/2Y3E-TAH5]; Alison Siegler & William
Admussen, Discovering Racial Discrimination by the Police, 115 NW. U. L. REV. 987 (2021).
In United States v. Davis, the Seventh Circuit authorized discovery to support the defendants’ claims of racially selective law enforcement by the ATF. 793 F.3d 712 (7th Cir. 2015) (en
banc). A similar discovery request in the case of a Latino defendant charged as a result of a reverse-sting operation similar to the one at issue in Davis was recently granted by the Southern
District of New York. United States v. Lopez, 415 F. Supp. 3d 422 (S.D.N.Y. 2019); see also United
States v. Washington, 869 F.3d 193, 217–22 (3d Cir. 2017); United States v. Sellers, 906 F.3d 848,
854–56 (9th Cir. 2018)
357. 476 U.S. 79, 89, 96 (1986).
358. Batson, 476 U.S. at 97.
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the strikes that the defense has challenged. 359 Finally, the trial court decides
whether defense counsel has shown that the prosecutor’s action was motivated
by invidious race discrimination. 360 Batson was meant to vindicate the rights
of not just the defendant but also of the venire members who came to the
courthouse to do their civic duty only to suffer exclusion because of their race. 361
The biggest problem with Batson is that the burden the prosecutor must
meet to defend a challenged strike is shamefully low. Courts have accepted
reasons for peremptory strikes that were implausible at best and baldly bigoted at worst. For example, one common reason offered to strike Black jurors
is a juror’s supposed “low intelligence” or “lack of education.” 362 Strikes because of “low intelligence” have been struck down in some cases, particularly
in light of “the role that the claim of ‘low intelligence’ has played in the history
of racial discrimination from juries.” 363 In other cases, like a case in Louisiana
where a prosecutor said that the prospective juror was “too stupid to live[,]
much less be on a jury,” 364 peremptory strikes based on this odious, facially
race-neutral explanation have been upheld. An Arkansas prosecutor was able
to defend his use of a peremptory strike by explaining he had a “hunch” that
a potential African American juror would be hostile to the State’s case even
though the prosecutor had not asked the juror about her views. 365 Courts have
also excluded Black jurors for reasons ranging from having dyed red hair 366 to
“wearing a large white hat and sunglasses.” 367 This flaw has ultimately reduced
Batson to a message without any muscle behind it. 368
In these cases, in contrast to the race-conscious admissions cases, there is
a decided lack of optimism about future improvement of race relations. In
each of these cases, the Court has been unmoved by arguments that its pronouncement would disproportionately burden communities of color, not because the Court was unconvinced but because it had lost the conviction that
it had a responsibility to make a difference. In the affirmative action cases, the
Court has endorsed the explicit inclusion of race as part of a nuanced, holistic
review of each applicant to create a diverse academic environment, and it has
forecasted that there will eventually be an end to the need for race-conscious
359. Id. at 97–98.
360. Id. at 98.
361. See Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 409 (1991) (holding that venire members have the
right not to be excluded based on their race).
362. EQUAL JUST. INITIATIVE, ILLEGAL RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN JURY SELECTION: A
CONTINUING LEGACY 17 (2010), https://eji.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/illegal-racial-discrimination-in-jury-selection.pdf [perma.cc/T9PL-6T83].
363. McGahee v. Ala. Dep’t of Corr., 560 F.3d 1252, 1265 (11th Cir. 2009).
364. State v. Crawford, 873 So. 2d 768, 776 (La. App. 2004), writ denied sub nom. State ex
rel. Crawford v. State, 901 So. 2d 1083 (La. 2005).
365. EQUAL JUST. INITIATIVE, supra note 362, at 18.
366. Id.
367. Id.
368. Kim Taylor-Thompson, Empty Votes in Jury Deliberations, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1261,
1281 (2000).
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admissions. 369 By contrast, the Court has endorsed implicit reliance on racial
stereotypes in McCleskey and the other criminal legal system cases—even if
reliance on those stereotypes produces racially disparate results—and suggested that those stereotypes are unavoidable. 370
III. INNOCENCE AND GUILT IN THE MIRROR
We have seen how arguments against affirmative action in higher education appear as funhouse versions of themselves in the disproportionate-minority-contact debate. So while affirmative action jurisprudence holds that
race and its attendant social and cultural implications can and will be amputated from consideration of a student’s candidacy, criminal justice jurisprudence holds that because of the exercise of prosecutorial discretion and
because jurors decide cases using their range of life experiences, invidious racial discrimination is “an inevitable part of our criminal justice system.” 371
Next, we will examine another contradiction. Affirmative action opponents argue that innocent white applicants who have not contributed to the
underrepresentation of Black students in colleges should not be made to suffer
the consequences of that inequity by losing a spot at the college of their
choice. 372 Meanwhile, those who question the inequity of disproportionate
minority contact ignore alarming statistics involving innocent nonwhite defendants wrongfully convicted on the basis of dubious evidence. 373
A. Innocence in Race-Conscious Admissions
Social movements grow from a cultural nucleus of shared narratives.
“[S]hared experiences and beliefs” based on “shared social and political perspectives” create a widely accessible cultural shorthand. 374 When there is a

369. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 343 (2003) (“We expect that 25 years from now,
the use of racial preferences will no longer be necessary to further the interest approved today.”).
370. See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 312–13 (1987).
371. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 312.
372. Professor Randall Kennedy has observed a similar connection between affirmative action and race-based police stops:
Many of the same arguments against race-based affirmative action are applicable as well
in the context of race-based police stops. . . . With affirmative action, many adversely affected whites claim that they are innocent victims of a policy that penalizes them for the
misconduct of others who also happened to have been white. With race-based police
stops, many adversely affected people of color maintain that they are innocent victims of
a policy that penalizes them for the misconduct of others who also happen to be colored. . . . There exist, however, a remarkable difference in reactions to these racial policies, both of which involve race-dependent decisionmaking. While affirmative action is
under tremendous pressure politically and legally, racial policing is not.

RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME, AND THE LAW 159–60 (1997).
373. See id. at 160.
374. James, supra note 55, at 482 (quoting Darren Lenard Hutchinson, Racial Exhaustion,
86 WASH. U. L. REV. 917, 924 (2008)).
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dominant group in a given society, the dominant group “legitimize[s] inequality by attributing group disparities to individual shortcomings instead of domination or bias.” 375 As Justice Harlan observed in Plessy, “[t]he white race” is
“the dominant race” in the United States “in prestige, in achievements, in education, in wealth and in power.” 376 Predictably, then, much of the rhetoric
critiquing race-conscious admissions policies tries to address the “unfairness”
of those policies to “innocent” white applicants 377 who lose out on a spot at an
elite university to a less qualified person of color. 378 In affirmative action jurisprudence, the idea of innocence most often refers to white applicants who
do not gain admission where affirmative action policies include race as an option. 379 The concept of innocence is turned on its head in race-conscious admissions and in the criminal legal system.
The concept of white innocence appears repeatedly in the Supreme
Court’s discussions of race-conscious admissions and employment policies.
Here are two examples of the Bakke Court referencing “innocence.” First, it
noted the unfairness of asking “innocent persons . . . to endure . . . [deprivation as] the price of membership in the dominant majority,” 380 and then it
stated the Court had “never approved a classification that aids persons perceived as members of relatively victimized groups at the expense of other innocent individuals in the absence of judicial, legislative, or administrative
findings of constitutional or statutory violations.” 381 In Wygant v. Jackson
Board of Education, 382 the Court struck down a collective bargaining agreement because, “as the basis for imposing discriminatory legal remedies that
work against innocent people, societal discrimination is insufficient and overexpansive.” 383 The Grutter Court worried that it had to be sure to “work the
least harm possible to other innocent persons competing for the benefit.” 384
The “innocence narrative” 385 and the idea that race-conscious admissions
programs are unfair to white people have both found traction beyond the four
corners of the Supreme Court’s decisions. White innocence is multilayered,
based in whites’ belief that their own “colorblind” upbringing does not in any
way contribute to the uneven distribution of opportunity in our society and
in whites’ deep misunderstanding that all discrimination is created equal. For
example, as Abigail Fisher explained, “I was taught from the time I was a little

375. Id. (alteration in original).
376. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
377. James, supra note 55, at 482 & nn.276–77.
378. Id. at 483.
379. See infra notes 380–384 and accompanying text.
380. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 294 n.34 (1978) (opinion of Powell,
J.) (emphasis added).
381. Id.at 307 (emphasis added).
382. 476 U.S. 267, 276 (1986).
383. Wygant, 476 U.S. at 276 (emphasis added).
384. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 341 (2003) (emphasis added).
385. James, supra note 55, at 481–89.
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girl that any kind of discrimination was wrong.” 386 Barbara Grutter also noted
that she had learned that racial discrimination was wrong 387 and cast herself
as a hero for challenging it. 388 And one of the parent-plaintiffs in Parents Involved in Community Schools 389 stated that “[i]t is clear that [white people]
were really treated unfairly” because “[o]nly 7.5% of students from Blaine
School who are white were assigned to their first-choice school.” 390 Since the
diversity rationale stands alone as the sole compelling interest available to
state institutions implementing affirmative action programs, equal protection
jurisprudence has staked out a clear position on when “discrimination” is permissible—not to remediate past discrimination against marginalized groups
but to create a multicultural environment for the benefit of white people.
This innocence narrative thrives even though white people are complicit
in the educational inequities that make race-conscious admissions policies
necessary. For a range of reasons, white people do not see the role they played
and continue to play in undermining quality education for children of
color. 391 In the years after Brown v. Board of Education prohibited school segregation, white people abandoned public schools in urban centers and resettled in the surrounding municipalities. 392 This phenomenon, called “white
flight,” left public schools in urban centers woefully underresourced and resegregated. 393 White parents opposed plans meant to encourage integration 394
and instead supported plans that cemented segregation, like discriminatory
tracking policies 395 and admissions schemes that depended heavily on standardized test scores. 396 These educational disparities, consistent across jurisdictions around the country, have been “dismissed as derivative of nonracial
factors, such as individual effort and merit,” with imperfect internalization of
the reality that “[s]ubordination today . . . is less likely to take the form of intentional discrimination, operating instead as less visible systematic and structural racism.” 397 White people are no freer of the country’s racist past than
Black people and other people of color. When it comes to the legacy of, and
continuing inequities in, educational disparities, almost no one is innocent. 398

386. Id. at 484–85.
387. Id. at 485.
388. Id.
389. Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 (2007).
390. James, supra note 55, at 485 & n.293.
391. Id. at 485–86.
392. Erika K. Wilson, The New White Flight, 14 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 233, 243
(2019).
393. Id. at 486 & nn.296–98.
394. Id. at 487, 486 n.301.
395. Id. at 487.
396. Id.
397. Id. at 488–89.
398. The five-episode podcast Nice White Parents investigates complicity and perpetuation
in education, examining the effects of gentrification on the School for International Studies in
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B. Innocence in the Criminal Legal System
A more than cursory glance in the funhouse mirror reveals that innocent
people are convicted all the time in the criminal legal system. 399 Take, for example, the National Registry of Exonerations, which tracks exonerations since
1989. Today, the registry has recorded over 2,700 felony exonerations, among
them over 130 capital defendants. 400 These are just the felony trials, in which
the accused often faces a substantial prison sentence or even death. Assuming
that felony trials concern “the most serious allegations, the most careful investigation, and the most vigorous defense,” the number of potential exonerees
in misdemeanor and municipal cases must be sky-high. 401 The “lax procedural
standards, prioritization of judicial efficiency, and over-reliance on plea agreements” in misdemeanor court must all lead, ineluctably, to convictions of innocent people. 402
Actual innocence stalks misdemeanor practice because there are so many
ways for a person accused of a crime to be wrongfully convicted. For example,
many kinds of forensic evidence, like on-scene drug tests, are very unreliable.
In 2016, ProPublica and the New York Times investigated the accuracy of field
drug tests. 403 The results were alarming. In one test, the chemical that detects
cocaine produces a false positive for 80 additional compounds, some of them
common household cleaners or medications. 404 To make matters worse, the
patina of scientific validity of these field tests bootstraps their high potential
for inaccuracy. It is estimated that at least one hundred thousand convictions
each year are based on field drug test results. 405

the Cobble Hill neighborhood in Brooklyn. Nice White Parents, N.Y. TIMES (May 5, 2021), https://
www.nytimes.com/2020/07/23/podcasts/nice-white-parents-serial.html [perma.cc/WCS2-D3U4].
399. These erroneous convictions happen even though a defendant is presumed to be innocent of the crime until convicted. See Presumption of Innocence, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY
(11th ed. 2019).
400. NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, http://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/Exonerations-in-the-United-States-Map.aspx [perma.cc/3BY3-WLND] (tracking
exonerations across the country and the number of years of prison time served by exonerees
since 1989). It reported that there have been 2,783 exonerations, of which 2,701 were felony
convictions, and that exonerees have served, or, as the website describes, “lost,” 24,915 years. Id.
401. Robin Walker Sterling, Invisible Injustice, 48 J. CMTY. PSYCH. 142, 147 (2019) (reviewing ALEXANDRA NATAPOFF, PUNISHMENT WITHOUT CRIME (2018)).
402. Id.
403. Ryan Gabrielson & Topher Sanders, Busted, PROPUBLICA (July 7, 2016),
https://www.propublica.org/article/common-roadside-drug-test-routinely-produces-false-positives [perma.cc/6WWA-XGZA].
404. Id. In 2019, Cody Gregg pled guilty to cocaine possession only to be exonerated two
days later when lab tests revealed that he had actually possessed powdered milk. Maurice Possley,
Cody Gregg, NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS (Oct. 18, 2019), https://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/casedetail.aspx?caseid=5626 [perma.cc/7QGD-5PW8].
405. Gabrielson & Sanders, supra note 403.
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Reliance on gang data bases, warrant data bases, and other kinds of electronic data also lead to wrongful convictions. 406 These include errors like
showing that someone’s license is suspended when it is not or someone’s car
registration has expired. 407 Thanks to Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, each of
these errors, even if it is incorrect, can provide the basis of an arrest. 408 Driving
is so common that “even a very low rate of error could produce thousands of
wrongful convictions.” 409 And criminal records are even less reliable than
DMV databases. 410
Order-maintenance policing, when someone is arrested for a quality-oflife crime like loitering, failing to obey a police officer, or disorderly conduct,
can also lead to wrongful convictions. 411 These kinds of cases are vulnerable
to wrongful conviction because they rely entirely upon the alleged observations of the witness, usually a police officer. The evidence rises and falls on the
police officer’s credibility. 412 But officers have many motivations to make arrests, like arrest quotas. 413 Because it is so discretionary, order-maintenance
policing is also rife with racial bias. For example, in 2011’s Operation Clean
Halls initiative, New York police officers arrested people, mostly African
American and Latino men, for trespassing onto housing projects even though
many of the arrestees were not in fact trespassing. 414 A public defender who
represented many of these men admitted that he had “a disgraceful number
of innocent clients.” 415
So the one institution that ostensibly exists to prioritize innocence, the
criminal legal system, does not. As is demonstrated by the fact that over 90
percent of criminal cases are resolved by plea agreements, defendants are very
likely to be convicted even though the law ascribes to them the presumption
of innocence. 416 Meanwhile, in civil litigation of affirmative action issues in
education, innocence is ascribed to white people challenging affirmative action, even though the de facto segregation that affirmative action seeks to correct can persist only with white cooperation.

406. NATAPOFF, supra note 59, at 95–96 (“A 2000 Florida legislative study of DMV insurance records found error rates as high as 35 percent . . . .”).
407. See id.
408. See 532 U.S. 318 (2001).
409. NATAPOFF, supra note 59, at 96.
410. Id.
411. Id. at 98, 102.
412. Id. at 98.
413. Id.
414. Id. at 98–99.
415. Id. at 99.
416. See U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, 2020 ANNUAL REPORT AND SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL
SENTENCING STATISTICS 56 (2021), https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-andpublications/annual-reports-and-sourcebooks/2020/2020-Annual-Report-and-Sourcebook.pdf
[perma.cc/3XMJ-DR7A] (noting that 97.8 percent of federal criminal convictions resulted from
guilty pleas).
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CONCLUSION
The last American slave ship, the schooner Clotilda, was discovered in
Alabama’s Mobile River in May 2019. 417 Chartered on a bet, the Clotilda disembarked from Mobile, Alabama, on March 4, 1860. 418 It arrived at the slave
trading port at Ouidah, in Benin, on May 15, 1860. 419 It left Ouidah on May
24, 1860, with 110 African young men, women, and children, and arrived in
Mobile, Alabama, on July 9, 1860, with 109. 420
In the decades during which the Clotilda was submerged, we have dismantled the legal scaffolding that supported chattel slavery and then Jim
Crow. But the tenacious narratives about Black intellectual inferiority and
criminality that justified chattel slavery continue to find expression in both
popular discourse and in legal doctrine. There are many possible foils to
these narratives: perhaps, at the bail stage, requiring prosecutors to undertake the same kind of holistic review of potential defendants that admissions officers are expected to perform; contrasting the results of
standardized tests for college admission with the results of risk assessment
instruments to reveal, once and for all, that these are flawed instruments
that do not actually assess what they purport to measure; and teaching a
more complete history in public schools that offers a full picture of both
the barbarities of chattel slavery and the unknowable ways enslaved people
rebelled. By contrasting affirmative action in higher education and disproportionate minority contact in the criminal legal system, we can exploit
the inconsistencies in how we understand Black underrepresentation in
the first and white underrepresentation in the second. In so doing, we can
accurately see how important legal principles in constitutional law and
criminal law intersect to perpetuate inequality.

417. See Joel K. Bourne, Jr., Last American Slave Ship Is Discovered in Alabama, NAT’L
GEOGRAPHIC (May 22, 2019), https://www.nationalgeographic.com/culture/2019/05/clotildathe-last-american-slave-ship-found-in-alabama [perma.cc/DN95-HF4Y].
418. Id.
419. Id.
420. Id.

